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ABSTRACT 
 To prevent friendly fire incidents and avoid duplication of effort, law enforcement 
agencies in the United States use multiple deconfliction systems to register investigative 
targets and notify outside units and agencies of proactive undercover operations. This 
research reveals that investigators are confused about which of the main systems to use in 
certain areas and that the use of multiple systems prevents investigators from gathering 
data on friendly fire incidents and restricts collaboration between agencies that are 
targeting the same criminals. Having one central deconfliction system for use by federal, 
state, local, and tribal authorities would make law enforcement officers’ jobs safer and 
would facilitate information sharing among the different units and agencies, leading to 
greater collaboration and more successful outcomes. 
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A deconfliction system’s primary purpose is to prevent friendly fire shootings 
among law enforcement agencies that conduct undercover operations and street 
enforcement operations. This research seeks to show how a single, nationwide 
deconfliction system could be implemented for law enforcement agencies in the United 
States—from the local to the federal—to improve safety, information sharing, and 
collaboration. To do so, the thesis examines the different deconfliction systems agencies 
currently use and reveals that the use of multiple systems limits investigators’ opportunities 
to connect with other agencies that are investigating similar targets. This lack of 
information can limit the investigation’s scope and cause an investigator to miss vital 
evidence, which may mean the investigator fails to arrest the subject. Additionally, the 
research shows that the use of multiple systems creates dangerous conditions for law 
enforcement personnel conducting proactive street investigations.  
The thesis presents three case studies that show how deconfliction plays a vital role 
in law enforcement investigations; the way that investigators use the knowledge gained 
from deconfliction meetings is up to them. The lead agent in Operation Fast and Furious, 
the first case study presented, deconflicted through personal meetings and the federal 
deconfliction database, DICE.1 Because the agent used the proper system to register her 
subjects, she received a notification when another agent attempted to register the same 
subject. This facilitated a meeting between the agencies; information the agent received in 
that meeting provided the evidence the agency needed to obtain a wiretap.2 While the agent 
used the deconfliction process correctly and prevented a possible blue-on-blue situation, 
the agency’s flawed investigation failed to capitalize on other information-sharing 
opportunities, which prolonged the investigation and resulted in the death of a border patrol 
agent.  
 
1 U.S. Department of Justice Office of Inspector General, A Review of ATF’s Operation Fast and 
Furious and Related Matters (Washington, DC: Department of Justice, 2012), 121, https://oig.justice.gov/
reports/2012/s1209.pdf. 
2 U.S. Department of Justice Office of Inspector General, 122. 
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The second case study examines Ross Ulbricht, who used modern technology to 
create the Silk Road, an online drug empire that stymied multiple law enforcement agencies 
for several years. Under his alias, Dread Pirate Roberts (DPR), Ross Ulbricht amassed a 
multimillion-dollar fortune while facilitating drug sales worldwide, all while remaining 
completely anonymous. Law enforcement agencies investigated Ulbricht and his website 
early on, but were only able to arrest low-level dealers. Then, as a result of a deconfliction 
meeting at the Department of Justice attended by all the agencies investigating the Silk 
Road, the investigation began to progress.3 Collaboration between multiple federal law 
enforcement agencies led investigators to identify Ross Ulbricht as DPR and allowed law 
enforcement to seize the Silk Road website.  
The final case study examines Sex Money Murder, a Bloods gang that dealt drugs 
and death throughout the Bronx, and nationally, while making millions of dollars. In law 
enforcement’s fight against the gang, collaboration between the New York City Police 
Department gang team, the North Carolina State Police, and the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives led to two federal convictions against gang leader Peter 
Rollack and the incarceration of the gang’s other members. The three agencies developed 
the evidence and provided the testimony that saw Rollack face the death penalty for his 
acts of violence. While the agencies’ collaboration did not come about because of 
deconfliction, a notification from the National Crime Information Center facilitated their 
initial information sharing.4 
The information sharing that leads to positive outcomes, however, is stymied when 
agencies use disparate systems. And without a policy or mandate for law enforcement 
agencies to participate in deconfliction systems, the systems are even less effective. The 
continued use of multiple systems despite evidence that shows the danger of poor 
integration gives the impression that the system organizers, along with the federal partners, 
do not care about officer safety. A standard deconfliction system offers safety benefits, 
 
3 Nick Bilton, American Kingpin: The Epic Hunt for the Criminal Mastermind behind the Silk Road 
(New York: Portfolio/Penguin, 2018), 239. 
4 Seth Ferranti, Street Legends, vol. 1 (Gorilla Convict Publications, 2010), 249. 
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increased information sharing, and collaboration; these benefits outweigh the main 
possible drawback, corruption.  
Changing the deconfliction environment will be a complicated task that will require 
multiple agencies to work together and to combine different databases. To alleviate some 
of the problems identified in this thesis, however, the law enforcement community must 
reduce deconfliction down to two systems and strongly push their universal use. Everyone 
who participates in the investigative effort would benefit from the elimination of 
information silos. For law enforcement to be successful, agencies must work together and 
share information; while deconfliction systems help keep officers safe, they also bring 
agencies together. The implementation of the incremental changes described in this thesis 
will increase officer safety during field operations, increase collaboration across multiple 
agencies, and reduce waste in funding and investigative overlap. These changes can occur 
if the members of the governing boards for the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas 
(HIDTA) and Regional Information Sharing System (RISS) are willing to accept that the 
deconfliction monopoly they participate in is dangerous to law enforcement officers and 
needs to be addressed.  
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A deconfliction system’s primary purpose is to prevent friendly fire shootings 
among law enforcement agencies that conduct undercover operations and street 
enforcement operations. The use of these systems, which began in the late 1980s, has 
expanded from investigations involving narcotics to those involving violent street gangs, 
nationwide economic scams, and human trafficking cases.1 In law enforcement, there are 
two types of deconfliction: target and event deconfliction. Target deconfliction is the 
process of registering subjects of an investigation with a central database along with their 
vehicles, residences, and other identifying information. This process informs other 
agencies about a possible conflict with their investigations if they attempt to register the 
same subjects, gives investigators case ownership, and informs other units that there is an 
active investigation. The other type of deconfliction, known as event deconfliction, takes 
place when an agency plans an enforcement operation, such as a search warrant or an 
undercover drug sale, at a particular location. The investigator registers the location to 
prevent other agencies from planning an enforcement operation at the same place.  
There are two significant problems with deconfliction in law enforcement: first, 
there are multiple systems in use and they are not interconnected; second, some agencies 
do not use the systems at all. Without a nationwide system for all agencies, law 
enforcement personnel in undercover operations face increased risk, and agencies that 
could benefit from joint investigative targets are inhibited from communicating. Police 
Chief James Hurley of Leicester, Massachusetts, offers an example. When Hurley was 
supervising a multiagency task force on an undercover drug buy, he discovered that the 
drug dealer being investigated was actually an undercover officer from another county, 
 
1 Tom Carr, Kent Shaw, and Jack Killorin, “Event Deconfliction Avoids Operational Conflicts, Saves 
Lives, and Solves Cases,” Police Chief, February 1, 2017, https://www.policechiefmagazine.org/event-
deconfliction-avoids-operational-conflicts/. 
2 
which forced Hurley to cancel the operation.2 During a meeting after the operation, the 
other department’s supervisor admitted that he did not know about deconfliction.3 
In the United States, a law enforcement agency’s location dictates the deconfliction 
system it uses—if it uses one at all. These systems operate under funding from the federal 
government, but, as mentioned, the systems are not interconnected. Currently, there are 
seven national or regional formal deconfliction systems, operated or funded by four 
separate government agencies. According to the Department of Justice, these multiple 
systems have led to confusion among law enforcement agencies and have prevented them 
from sharing case information and collaborating on investigations.4 The use of a central 
database shared by task forces across the United States has improved information sharing 
and helped to increase arrests of pedophiles. Such a single database might offer solutions 
for a deconfliction systems. As such, this thesis asks: How can a single, nationwide 
deconfliction system for federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies improve 
safety, information sharing, and collaboration?  
A. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review examines the available published material about 
deconfliction in law enforcement and explores whether a single national system might 
increase information sharing and collaboration. The first section of the review focuses on 
the importance of collaboration in law enforcement, and particularly what experts have 
identified is needed for successful collaboration. The second section focuses on 
information sharing in the law enforcement community and examines whether it has 
improved since 9/11. This review contains reports from the federal government, academic 
journals, and published theses.  
 
2 Carr, Shaw, and Killorin. 
3 Carr, Shaw, and Killorin. 
4 Eileen Larence, Combating Child Pornography: Steps Are Needed to Ensure That Tips to Law 
Enforcement Are Useful and Forensic Examinations Are Cost Effective, GAO-11-334 (Washington, DC: 
Government Accountability Office, 2011), 30, https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-334. 
3 
1. Collaboration  
In the aftermath of 9/11, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the 
United States (known as the 9/11 Commission) called for increased information sharing 
and cooperation among all levels of government.5 Almost twenty years after the attacks 
and the publishing of the 9/11 Commission’s report, scholars and law enforcement experts 
argue that although information sharing and collaboration in the law enforcement 
community have improved, there is still a long way to go.6 In particular, experts believe 
that three factors are important for increasing collaboration among law enforcement 
agencies: trust, resources, and clarity about roles and responsibilities.  
Interagency collaboration depends on trust between agencies and, more 
importantly, among workers. As Renee Graphia Joyal defines it in Criminal Justice 
Studies, “Trust refers to the degree that one agency or person has that another agency or 
person is both competent and honest.”7 She further states that trust-based relationships 
generate reciprocity, genuineness, and confidence in other workers and agencies.8 Trust 
between these parties ensures that the information they exchange is timely and accurate 
and that it will not be misused.9 Government mandates for collaborative agreements can 
evolve if the participants show that they are willing to foster positive relationships and 
attempt to collaborate as they work to resolve their problems.10 E. Madalina Busuioc 
strengthens this reasoning, showing that a lack of trust among the collaborating agencies 
in Europol is one of the reasons that the agency has had difficulty achieving success.11 
 
5 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report: 
Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (New York: W. W. 
Norton & Company, 2004), 263.  
6 Renee Graphia Joyal, “How Far Have We Come? Information Sharing, Interagency Collaboration, 
and Trust within the Law Enforcement Community,” Criminal Justice Studies 25, no. 4 (December 2012): 
357, https://doi.org/10.1080/1478601X.2012.728789. 
7 Joyal, 366. 
8 Joyal, 366. 
9 Andreas Riege, “Three-Dozen Knowledge-Sharing Barriers Managers Must Consider,” Journal of 
Knowledge Management 9, no. 3 (2005): 24, https://doi.org/10.1108/13673270510602746. 
10 Joyal, “How Far Have We Come,” 362. 
11 E. Madalina Busuioc, “Friend or Foe? Inter-agency Cooperation, Organizational Reputation, and 
Turf,” Public Administration 94, no. 1 (March 2016): 42, https://doi.org/10.1111/padm.12160. 
4 
Europol’s member agencies focus on reputation and public perception; protecting their 
“turf” is more important than building trust among partner agencies.12 In a Government 
Accountability Office report, J. Christopher Mihm also identified trust as foundational to 
positive working relationships between participants, as it helps bridge institutional and 
cultural differences.13  
The literature also identifies availability of resources as an integral part of 
collaboration. Janet Weiss believes that if groups do not secure resources at the start of a 
collaborative effort, the process will grind to a halt and the effort will lose whatever 
participants it has.14 Resource sharing and financial support are two of the main reasons 
that agencies participate in collaborative efforts.15 Without sufficient funding, the team 
may be unable to complete their work and some team members may leave due to strains 
on their departments. Even though Weiss claims some agencies may participate when 
funding is unavailable, funding is a reliable indicator of successful collaboration.16 
Collaboration may also fail when team members cannot participate on a regular schedule 
or become overworked and incapable of completing their tasks.17 
Finally, collaboration among agencies improves when each agency’s roles and 
responsibilities are clearly defined. Mihm states that an agreed-upon process for decision 
making and clarity of roles in a memorandum of understanding will lead to a successful 
 
12 Busuioc, 43. 
13 J. Christopher Mihm, Managing for Results: Key Considerations for Implementing Interagency 
Collaborative Mechanisms, GAO-12-1022 (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2012), 
14, https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-1022. 
14 Janet A. Weiss, “Pathways to Cooperation among Public Agencies,” Journal of Policy Analysis and 
Management 7, no. 1 (1987): 111, https://doi.org/10.2307/3323353. 
15 Russell M. Frazier, “A Cannon for Cooperation: A Review of the Interagency Cooperation 
Literature,” Journal of Public Administration and Governance 4, no. 1 (2014): 10, https://doi.org/10.5296/
jpag.v4i1.4870; Frederick M. Kaiser, Interagency Collaborative Arrangements and Activities: Types, 
Rationales, Considerations, CRS Report No. R41803 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 
2011), 12, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=5216. 
16 Weiss, “Pathways to Cooperation among Public Agencies,” 99. 
17 Mary Atkinson, Paul Doherty, and Kay Kinder, “Multi-agency Working: Models, Challenges and 
Key Factors for Success,” Journal of Early Childhood Research 3, no. 1 (February 2005): 116, https://doi.
org/10.1177/1476718X05051344. 
5 
collaborative effort.18 Clearly defined roles can also mitigate conflict among team 
members over different policy ideas.19 Everyone must understand their specific role in the 
group, the roles that specific agencies perform, and the limitations placed on team members 
by their agencies.20 However, as Busuioc has shown, even with a consensus, it may be 
challenging to get all participating agencies to cooperate completely. For example, even 
though Europol was created by convention in 1995 and funded by the European Union, it 
still sees poor cooperation and information sharing between member offices.21 
2. Barriers to Information Sharing  
Like collaboration, poor information sharing among law enforcement and 
government agencies was acknowledged as a contributing factor to the 9/11 attacks.22 
Scholars and practitioners suggest that overcoming institutional and cultural differences, 
fostering trust among partner agencies, and improving technology improves information 
sharing. Improved information sharing, in turn, leads to greater collaboration on complex 
issues and increased resources. Writing for the Journal of Knowledge Management, 
Andreas Riege similarly describes a triad of barriers to information sharing: individual, 
organizational, and technological.23 Individual barriers that prohibit information sharing 
include time—which is needed to identify who needs the information—and lack of trust—
e.g., that other agencies will misuse or take credit for the information.24  
As it pertains to the first element in Riege’s triad—individual barriers Lambert 
notes that some officers fail to share information because they believe the information they 
 
18 Mihm, Managing for Results, 18. 
19 Kaiser, Interagency Collaborative Arrangements and Activities, 17. 
20 Atkinson, Doherty, and Kinder, “Multi-agency Working,” 120. 
21 Busuioc, “Friend or Foe,” 46. 
22 Rahul Bhaskar and Yi Zhang, “Knowledge Sharing in Law Enforcement: A Case Study,” Journal 
of Information Privacy and Security 3, no. 3 (July 2007): 45, https://doi.org/10.1080/
15536548.2007.10855821. 
23 Riege, “Three-Dozen Knowledge-Sharing Barriers,” 23. 
24 Riege, 24. 
6 
possess is not a priority.25 As Rick Brown indicates, however, a significant amount of 
modern police work now involves reviewing data to uncover criminal connections that may 
go beyond local jurisdictions.26 For information sharing to work, members of all law 
enforcement agencies must be able to collect and refer pertinent information to the agency 
or unit where it is needed. Law enforcement agencies are also constrained by legal factors; 
for instance, they cannot share sealed records and officers must not violate people’s civil 
liberties when they obtain or share information.27 Paul Hendriks shows that information 
sharing provides a link between the individual workers who gather information and those 
at the level of the organization where the information becomes useful.28 In law 
enforcement circles, that information leads to arrests and crime prevention. Many in the 
profession do not understand, however, that information sharing is also a component of 
ordinary policing.29  
Rahul Bhaskar and Yi Zhang’s case study explores the factors that influence 
information sharing in law enforcement. They state that people are reluctant to share 
information without strong personal motivation and that these motivations are influenced 
by internal and external factors.30 Internal motivating factors include benefits, or power, 
that an individual may gain from sharing the information.31 Some may have a specific 
reason for sharing information, for instance, to solve an investigation. If investigators fail 
to share information about a hard case, the investigation may never be resolved; the desire 
to solve the investigation may cause a determined investigator to overcome the personal 
 
25 Lambert, “Addressing Challenges to Homeland Security Information Sharing,” 1258. 
26 Rick Brown, “Understanding Law Enforcement Information Sharing for Criminal Intelligence 
Purposes,” Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice, no. 566, (December 2018): 1. 
27 Steven Chermak et al., “Law Enforcement’s Information Sharing Infrastructure: A National 
Assessment,” Police Quarterly (February 19, 2013): 228, https://doi.org/10.1177/1098611113477645. 
28 Paul Hendriks, “Why Share Knowledge? The Influence of ICT on the Motivation for Knowledge 
Sharing,” Knowledge and Process Management 6, no. 2 (June 1999): 91. 
29 David E. Lambert, “Addressing Challenges to Homeland Security Information Sharing in American 
Policing: Using Kotter’s Leading Change Model,” Criminal Justice Policy Review, July 18, 2018, 1251, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0887403418786555. 
30 Bhaskar and Zhang, “Knowledge Sharing in Law Enforcement,” 48. 
31 Bhaskar and Zhang, 48. 
7 
barrier of hoarding information.32 One external factor that affects information sharing is 
establishing and building relationships with other agencies and officials, including building 
trust with particular officials in coordinating agencies.33 Other external factors include 
recognition or rewards from coworkers and supervisors and increased solidarity among 
those involved with the information-sharing effort.34 
Organizational barriers that lead to a lack of information sharing (the second 
element in Riege’s triad) include poor leadership or direction when communicating the 
benefits of information sharing, and competition with other agencies.35 Riege states that 
an organization’s structure, such as a hierarchical structure, may limit sharing, as can an 
organization’s culture.36 To overcome cultural influences, agencies must integrate their 
goals and strategy. Senior management is responsible for communicating the company’s 
goals to all employees so they understand and support the mission.37 In their case study, 
Bhasker and Zhang found that law enforcement traditionally does not encourage 
information sharing, relying instead on jurisdictional and legal restrictions to enforce a 
“need to know” attitude.38  
Likewise, David Lambert states that information silos negatively affect information 
sharing. Some individuals and agencies will hoard information and hide behind cultural 
barriers that dissuade information sharing.39 Agencies will “silo” or “stovepipe” and refuse 
to share information because they feel that the organization requesting the information is 
 
32 Bhaskar and Zhang, 53. 
33 Bhaskar and Zhang, 48. 
34 Sirkka L. Jarvenpaa and D. Sandy Staples, “Exploring Perceptions of Organizational Ownership of 
Information and Expertise,” Journal of Management Information Systems 18, no. 1 (May 31, 2001): 157, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/07421222.2001.11045673. 
35 Riege, “Three-Dozen Knowledge-Sharing Barriers,” 25. 
36 Riege, 26, 30. 
37 Riege, 26. 
38 Bhaskar and Zhang, “Knowledge Sharing in Law Enforcement,” 55. 
39 David E. Lambert, “Addressing Challenges to Homeland Security Information Sharing in American 
Policing: Using Kotter’s Leading Change Model:,” Criminal Justice Policy Review, July 18, 2018, 1259, 
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less competent.40 Some organizations only share with locally known agencies, or only 
regionally or federally.41 Lambert has found that silos can also form within an agency, 
either between different departments or between people who are deemed to have lower 
status in the organization; these silos in both cases cause “institutional friction” and prevent 
reciprocity of information.42 Overcoming such cultural issues requires not only technology 
but also an openness to learning. Key managers and leaders must encourage behavioral 
awareness and interconnectivity among people and organizations.43 Clear directives about 
the department’s mission from leadership will routinize information sharing. While 
Lambert discovered these issues with police organizations, Tom Ruddy has observed 
similar issues with non-law-enforcement or nongovernment organizations.44   
For the final element in his triad, Riege notes that technological factors also 
constrain effective information sharing. Bashkar and Zhang also found that technology can 
both increase and inhibit information sharing.45 Hendriks agrees that the use of proper 
technology allows people and agencies to reduce the temporal and spatial barriers to 
effective information sharing.46 Without proper technology, Riege emphasizes, people 
often cannot share information.47 Bhaskar and Zhang further this idea, stating that 
technology that does not fit the requirements for the agency will have limited use.48 Other 
technological barriers that inhibit information sharing include poor systems integration, 
poor compatibility between systems, and improper training on systems.49 Additionally, 
when people do not understand the advantages of new technology over existing systems, 
 
40 Lambert, “Addressing Challenges to Homeland Security Information Sharing,” 1260. 
41 Lambert, 1260. 
42 Lambert, 1259. 
43 Ruddy, “Taking Knowledge from Heads,” 37. 
44 Ruddy. 
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48 Bhaskar and Zhang, “Knowledge Sharing in Law Enforcement,” 50. 
49 Riege, “Three-Dozen Knowledge-Sharing Barriers,” 29. 
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they are less likely to use the new technology.50 The authors agree that with proper 
utilization of technology, information sharing will improved. 
Lambert also highlights technological factors with information sharing. He states 
that leadership must continuously communicate that effectively sharing information 
through proper deconfliction platforms will, for example, allow police officers to identify 
burglars or map out robbery patterns.51 Information sharing in this environment will also 
provide feedback on crime issues and improve two-way communication.52 As Hendriks 
states, however, if people are not motivated to share information, it is also likely that they 
are not motivated by the information-sharing tools available to them.53 Sharon Dawes 
believes that harnessing such technology can improve the accuracy and timeliness of 
information; she opines that information is essential for problem solving, and that timely, 
accurate information improves decision making, placing the organization in a better 
position to respond to the situation.54  
In addition to its benefits for information sharing, technology can also act as a 
catalyst for organizational change.55 When organizations define strategies that support use 
of particular programs, employees begin to accept the programs as a routine part of the job; 
in doing so, information sharing increases.56 Riege argues that organizations must integrate 
infrastructure that supports various technologies as well as employees’ work-related needs. 
If organizations promote improper technology that does not work for the employees, they 
may form a barrier to sharing.57  
 
50 Riege, 29. 
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57 Riege, “Three-Dozen Knowledge-Sharing Barriers,” 30. 
10 
Successful information sharing occurs when organizations finds a successful 
balance of technology, process, and content.58 For example, a 2011 Government 
Accountability Office report reveals an increase in arrests for child pornography cases after 
the creation of a specific database for investigations into the distribution of child 
pornography.59 The creation of a single peer-to-peer central database fostered 
communication among investigators in separate jurisdictions, allowing them to share 
evidence and case information.60 The investigators, the database, and the system all had a 
single goal: to apprehend people who trade child pornography. The new system allowed 
them to share information and achieve that goal.  
3. Conclusion 
Because there is little information or research on deconfliction systems, it is 
difficult to draw conclusions about how the different deconfliction systems perform. A 
greater understanding of such systems is necessary to determine if they are providing the 
benefits that they advertise, including keeping officers safe and reducing duplication of 
effort. This thesis examines the current deconfliction systems in use by law enforcement 
and determines if they function as designed while supporting law enforcement. It also seeks 
to determine if the current use of multiple systems, coupled with inconsistent policies by 
law enforcement agencies, confuses officers and agents, reducing information sharing and 
collaboration and increasing the dangers to law enforcement.  
B. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis examines how a national deconfliction system will increase safety for 
law enforcement agencies while improving information sharing and collaboration in 
investigations. The first step is to understand the deconfliction process and why it is 
necessary for law enforcement. Although published information on deconfliction is scarce, 
published U.S. government reports and articles, as well as a previously published thesis, 
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are the basis for this research. It does not use surveys, interviews, focus groups, or 
personally collected data, as there is little information on deconfliction in law enforcement. 
The result is a recommended plan of action and the development of a new deconfliction 
system that will increase law enforcement safety and collaboration. Using policy analysis 
and policy options analysis, the thesis specifically looks at how, through the deconfliction 
system, agencies in different parts of the country could become aware of other agencies 
investigating the same target. The thesis also evaluates studies and policy 
recommendations in law enforcement sources; law enforcement understands that 
cooperation is necessary to combat growing criminal threats.  
This thesis uses program evaluation and case study analysis to examine 
collaboration in the following law enforcement investigations: 
• Operation Fast and Furious: the failed gunwalking scandal at the 
Department of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) that 
resulted in the death of a U.S. Border Patrol agent. 
• Ross Ulbricht: known as the Dread Pirate Roberts of the Silk Road, 
Ulbricht was arrested for selling drugs on the dark web through the 
combined efforts of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Department 
of the Treasury, and Homeland Security Investigations. 
• Sex Money Murder: the Bloods street gang that dealt narcotics along the 
Eastern Seaboard and ruthlessly killed anyone who got in their way. Gang 
members were arrested through the combined efforts of the New York 
City Police Department (NYPD), the ATF, and North Carolina State 
Police.  
These cases highlight that through the combined efforts of multiple agencies, law 
enforcement can target and destroy significant drug trafficking organizations. The case 
studies also analyze the increased use of federal task forces, which lead to better 
cooperation among law enforcement agencies. The thesis uses the case studies to examine 
the possible ramifications of increased information sharing and collaboration in law 
12 
enforcement and the dangers that agencies and investigators must avoid. The final goal of 
this thesis is to develop a proof of concept to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed 
deconfliction system. 
Ultimately, this thesis examines the deconfliction environment in law enforcement 
and attempts to analyze how it can be improved to facilitate better information sharing and 
collaboration. The following chapters define event and target deconfliction, and describe 
the multiple systems that facilitate the deconfliction process. Additionally, the cases studies 
show how use of the deconfliction systems have enabled some law enforcement agencies 
to share information and collaborate on investigations that may have failed without outside 
agency assistance. The final chapter provides an analysis of the current deconfliction 
environment and three possible options to improve the process. 
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II. LAW ENFORCEMENT AND DECONFLICTION  
The United States has law enforcement entities at the federal, state, local, and tribal 
levels, all of which have responsibilities that, at times, intersect another agency’s area of 
responsibility. The vast number of agencies and the numerous officers they employ 
complicate investigations and increase the need for deconfliction. This chapter examines 
the benefits and drawbacks of the deconfliction systems agencies use today. The use of 
disparate systems and the absence of proper policies from executives can lead to confusion, 
can prevent information sharing, and can break down trust in law enforcement.  
The federal government is the largest single law enforcement employer. Over 
132,000 people work as federal officers in 83 separate agencies.61 The principal functions 
of federal law enforcement agencies include prevention, detection, and investigation of 
crimes and the apprehension of criminals.62 The federal government’s primary law 
enforcement agencies are the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS). According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the DOJ and DHS 
combined employ 70 percent of the federal law enforcement officers. The remaining 30 
percent fall under the federal government’s separate agencies, including the Department of 
Agriculture, Bureau of Prisons, and Department of Energy.63 According to the Office of 
Personnel Management, in 2019, 82,000 agents, or 62 percent of the workforce, were 
federal investigators.64  
Over 17,000 other law enforcement agencies operate at the state, local, and tribal 
levels.65 According to the Uniformed Crime Reporting program maintained by the FBI, in 
 
61 Conner Brooks, Federal Law Enforcement Officers, 2016 - Statistical Tables, NCJ 251922 
(Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics, October 2019, 3, https://www.bjs.gov/
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62 Brooks, 1. 
63 Brooks, 5. 
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65 Duren Banks et al., National Sources of Law Enforcement Employment Data, NCJ 249681 
(Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics, April 2016), 3, https://www.bjs.gov/
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2016, over 750,000 people were employed in the United States as sworn law enforcement 
officers. Sworn employees are armed personnel who can enforce the laws of their 
government, such as state police, county sheriffs, local police, and tribal police.66 Another 
325,000 people are employed as non-sworn officers assisting law enforcement.67  
Because of the large number of law enforcement officers and the diverse agencies, 
deconfliction is essential for officer safety and agency collaboration. As previously 
mentioned, deconfliction is the limited sharing of information among law enforcement 
agencies to identify common investigative targets or activity.68 Law enforcement agencies 
in the United States employ two types of deconfliction: target deconfliction for 
investigations and event deconfliction for enforcement activities. Target deconfliction 
identifies investigations with the same criminal subjects, and event deconfliction notifies 
law enforcement agencies of planned enforcement events.69 The notification methods 
range from regional or national computer databases at the local, state, and federal level to 
direct person-to-person contact with an outside law enforcement agency. These systems 
are operated and maintained by different law enforcement agencies and are supported by 
funding from the federal government through grant programs. 
One program, the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) program, 
operates two sub-programs: Case Explorer, a deconfliction and records management 
system, and the Secure Automated Fast Event Tracking Network (SAFETnet). While 
funded by HIDTA, these two systems are used regionally throughout the United States; 
law enforcement agencies can choose which system to use.70 The Regional Information 
 
66 Banks et al., 2. 
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70 David Maurer, Office of National Drug Control Policy: Lack of Progress on Achieving National 
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Sharing Systems (RISS) Program operates RISSSafe, which is similar to Case Explorer 
and SAFETnet but offers only event deconfliction.71 Law enforcement agencies may also 
use the El Paso Intelligence Center’s system, the Deconfliction Internet Connectivity 
Endeavor (DICE), or the Special Operations Division (SOD), all of which are operated by 
the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). 
A. THE THREE MAIN DECONFLICTION SYSTEMS 
The High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) program maintains two of the 
three primary deconfliction systems used by law enforcement, Case Explorer and 
SAFETnet. The HIDTA program was formed under the Office of National Drug Control 
Policy (ONDCP) in 1988 when Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act.72 The HIDTA 
program’s goal is to provide funding, assistance, and investigative support to federal, state, 
local, and tribal law enforcement agencies to combat drug trafficking and distribution.73 
The HIDTA program targets drug production and trafficking by: 
• Coordinating and sharing information with law enforcement agencies at 
all levels of government; 
• Increasing and facilitating intelligence-sharing among federal, state, 
local, and tribal law enforcement;  
• Assisting law enforcement in designing programs to counter the drug 
threat in their communities; and 
• Coordinating across multiple law enforcement agencies to reduce the 
drug supply locally and nationally.74 
HIDTA is a regionally based program that uses the county as the geographic unit 
of inclusion. Individual executive boards comprising law enforcement representatives 
assist the local law enforcement agencies with additional funding for investigations 
provided by the ONDCP.75 The local executive boards have a great deal of discretion in 
 
71 Maurer, 18. 
72 Kristin Finklea, High Intensity Drug Trafficking Program (HIDTA) Program, R45188 
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determining how to tailor their policies to fight narcotics issues in the region. Regional 
HIDTAs span every state as well as Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands.76 The 
HIDTAs operate with a great deal of autonomy from each other and from the ONDCP to 
design drug control policies that fit their specific regions and to spend their funds as they 
see fit. The autonomy of the separate HIDTAs has led to the funding of duplicate programs 
in the deconfliction environment: the Case Explorer system and SAFETnet.  
1. Case Explorer  
One of the two deconfliction systems developed and maintained by HIDTA is the 
Case Explorer system, which matches data between cases and organizations to determine 
if there is overlap. Released in 2005 by the Washington/Baltimore HIDTA, Case Explorer 
is a web-based case management, criminal intelligence, and deconfliction system, as well 
as an information-sharing tool for law enforcement that allows agents and officers to 
register information in the system about investigative targets and planned enforcement 
events for deconfliction.77 If investigators receive a registration number back from Case 
Explorer, there is no conflict with any other investigation or planned operation; the 
registration number allows the investigator to move forward. However, investigators 
receive a conflict notification when they attempt to register a target already registered to 
someone else, or when they plan an event in proximity to an existing operation. The conflict 
notification contains the contact information of the already registered investigator. While 
the system was designed and built by the Washington/Baltimore HIDTA, Case Explorer is 
open to all twenty-nine HIDTAs in the country and to the law enforcement agencies that 
they serve at the federal, state, local, and tribal levels.78 It also provides enterprise case 
management functions to help investigators build and develop cases on their targets.79  
 
76 Finklea, 3. 
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2. SAFETnet 
The Secure Automated Fast Event Tracking Network (SAFETNet) is the other 
deconfliction system operated by HIDTA and is more secure then Case Explorer because 
it contains no specific case information. The New York/New Jersey HIDTA created 
SAFETnet in 2001; it was the first online computer database for event and target 
deconfliction in the United States. SAFETnet is a decentralized system used in multiple 
locations throughout the country and is open for use by all law enforcement agencies.80 
While SAFETnet is a deconfliction system, it differs from Case Explorer because it does 
not provide case management functions. The system does operate, however, in the same 
manner as Case Explorer: the user inputs the relevant information about a person or 
location into the system, and the user receives a registration number if no conflicts exist. If 
the system finds a conflict, the user receives a point of contact for the other investigator. 
The investigator who finds the conflict is responsible for speaking with the owner of the 
registration. Because SAFETNet is not a records management system, no relevant case 
information is stored in the system outside of the investigative targets and event locations; 
this provides greater case security.  
3. RISSafe 
Local law enforcement agencies realized they needed a way to share information 
about the growing and sophisticated organized criminal organizations that crossed the city, 
state, and county jurisdictions.81 Since 1973, the Regional Information Sharing Systems 
(RISS) Program, created by the Bureau of Justice Administration (BJA), has done just that, 
providing technical support for criminal investigations to enhance officer safety.82 RISS is 
a collection of local and state police departments that collect, analyze, and distribute law 
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enforcement intelligence and information relevant to the region.83 Operated with funds and 
grants from the BJA, RISS has six regional centers—which cover all fifty states—and a 
technical support center locally managed by a policy board or executive committee.84 The 
executives of each RISS center form the RISS National Policy Group and are responsible 
for strategic planning and nationwide organization.85 
RISS provides many distinct functions for law enforcement employing different 
operational mechanisms, and one of RISS’s primary functions is to operate the RISS 
Officer Safety Deconfliction System (RISSafe).86 RISSafe was created in 2009 and is the 
third primary deconfliction system for law enforcement. RISSafe is a web-based system 
that automatically informs the submitting officer of an event conflict. The RISS watch 
center also receives a notification about the event conflict and attempts to deconflict the 
operation to ensure officer safety. The RISS watch center operates 24 hours a day, 365 
days a year to assist with event deconfliction and provide support for law enforcement. 
RISSafe, unlike Case Explorer and SAFETNet, tracks data only for officer safety event 
deconfliction, such as search warrants, controlled buys, or surveillances.87 
B. THE EL PASO INTELLIGENCE CENTER 
The El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) assists law enforcement with timely 
intelligence analysis on threats to the United States that originate in the Western 
Hemisphere; while it was created to perform an all-threat mission, it focuses on drug 
interdiction88 EPIC is a DEA-led organization with twenty-seven partner law enforcement 
agencies that focus on narcotics, drugs, human trafficking, and weapons trafficking along 
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the southwest border (SWB).89 A primary component of EPIC is the twenty-four-hour 
watch center, which operates seven days a week. The watch center responds to requests 
from law enforcement officers and alerts from the Law Enforcement Inquiries and Alerts 
(LIEA) system, an information exchange system maintained by the DEA.90 One function 
of the watch section is tactical intelligence, entering lookouts and detections. The watch 
section personnel connect personnel who enter a lookout on the same person or vehicle.91 
EPIC also hosts SAFETNet for the SWB region and the National Virtual Pointer System, 
which allows EPIC to search multiple databases to conduct event and target 
deconfliction.92 An officer or agent can request these actions by calling the center for 
assistance.  
C. DICE 
Created in 2010, the Deconfliction Internet Connectivity Endeavor (DICE) is a 
DEA-maintained deconfliction database for use by participating federal, state, local, and 
tribal law enforcement.93 All DOJ and DHS agencies are mandated to use DICE to 
deconflict any case-related information, telephone numbers, email addresses, license 
plates, and IP addresses.94 DICE operates in the same manner as RISSSafe, Case Explorer, 
and SAFETnet: the system generates a conflict if the information entered into the system 
matches current information. The system notifies the investigator if there is a conflict.95 
DOJ and DHS also require agents to use local and regional deconfliction systems when 
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practical, since law enforcement agencies at the state, local, and tribal levels may not use 
DICE for deconfliction purposes.96 
D. SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIVISION  
To coordinate investigations of large-scale drug trafficking organizations, the DEA 
created the Special Operations Division (SOD) The SOD is a multiagency coordination 
center designed to identify overlapping investigations into transnational drug trafficking 
organizations and enhance deconfliction and communications among the agencies.97 SOD 
oversees the deconfliction and information sharing among twenty government agencies. 
This oversight allows the DEA to deconflict classified and sensitive information and 
connect cases in different parts of the country and the world.98 If SOD discovers a 
connection between separate cases, supervisors in charge of the investigations will connect 
these cases at coordination meetings.  
E. PARTNER DECONFLICTION INTERFACE 
When it became clear that the fractured nature of the three main deconfliction 
systems was a safety issue, the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council (CICC) began 
exploring ways to integrate the systems. The CICC serves as a voice for all law 
enforcement agencies by facilitating the sharing of intelligence to prevent criminal 
activity.99 In 2013, the CICC, including members of HIDTA, RISS, DEA, and BJA, 
formed an event deconfliction policy group.100 The policy group determined that, to keep 
officers safe, all law enforcement agencies must conduct event deconfliction using one of 
the three universally recognized deconfliction systems: Case Explorer, SAFETnet, or 
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RISSafe.101 And to provide maximum coverage nationwide, the three systems would need 
to become interconnected.102  
In May 2015, HIDTA and RISS announced the Partner Deconfliction Interface 
(PDI), the interconnection of the three systems for only event deconfliction; the PDI does 
not include target deconfliction. The PDI connected all systems except SAFETnet in New 
York City .103  With the PDI, a submission into one deconfliction system will return results 
from the other two systems. The goal was to have as many law enforcement agencies as 
possible connecting through the systems, and to avoid the need to mandate use of one 
system over the others. In its first five months, the PDI reportedly processed over 159,000 
target deconflictions in the combined systems.104 However, because the PDI is limited to 
event deconfliction, there remains an issue with investigative targets. 
F. CURRENT PROBLEMS WITH DECONFLICTION 
In addition to the multiple deconfliction systems in use across the country, 
collaboration and information sharing across law enforcement agencies are also inhibited 
by inconsistent agency deconfliction practices, a lack of agency policy, and jurisdictional 
conflicts. These issues have diminished trust between agencies and discouraged 
interagency agreements that seek to avoid duplication of efforts, which increases the 
likelihood that officers will compromise an investigation.105 Furthermore, the variety of 
methods used for deconfliction has led to confusion and has negatively affected officer 
safety. Some agencies believe that information regarding specific investigations is too 
sensitive to be included in deconfliction systems and that inclusion in the system may 
jeopardize the investigation.106  
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This section highlights the confusion caused by the current use of multiple 
deconfliction systems and the cascading issues with information sharing and a lack of 
institutional trust among law enforcement agencies. It also discusses problems with 
including information from sensitive investigations in deconfliction systems, and possible 
issues with corrupt police officers and agents.  
1. Deconfliction Systems by State  
While law enforcement agencies and associations—including the DOJ, DHS, and 
International Association of Chiefs of Police—realize that event deconfliction can save 
lives, not everyone participates.107 Each law enforcement agency decides whether it wants 
to participate in the system that is available in its region of the country; no federal authority 
mandates participation in any deconfliction system. The map in Figure 1 breaks down the 
different deconfliction systems available by state. It is telling that Texas, New Mexico, and 
Arizona, which are in the SWB region, all use multiple systems for deconfliction, as this 
region deals with the most substantial flow of narcotics into the United States, and the use 
of multiple systems breeds inefficiency.108 
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Figure 1. Deconfliction Systems by State109 
No agency at any level of government has direct oversight of deconfliction systems 
and their use. Without such oversight, it is not possible to analyze the threats to law 
enforcement safety in blue-on-blue situations. Oversight and analysis would also allow 
agencies to identify duplication of efforts and help them reduce operational 
inefficiencies.110 
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2. Sensitive Information and Corruption Issues  
Despite their necessity for officer safety and collaboration, some agencies resist 
deconfliction systems because they believe the systems may compromise their 
investigation. FBI agents, for example, have refused to deconflict public corruption 
cases.111 Agents believe that since public corruption investigations may involve multiple 
subjects, some being members of law enforcement, the investigation may be compromised 
if the subject accesses the system.112 Additionally, due to the sensitivity of their nature and 
the systems’ lack of security, investigations related to national security and investigations 
that are classified investigations may not be included in deconfliction systems.  
Deconfliction systems can also be exploited by corrupt law enforcement officers 
who are looking to target known money or drug traffickers for robberies. If the 
deconfliction system returns the corrupt officer a registration number, meaning there is no 
conflict with another investigation, the officer knows that his robbery of this person may 
go unnoticed and will not be exposed. A corrupt law enforcement officer may also use 
target deconfliction to protect a drug dealer or other criminal by holding registration on the 
dealer. If the corrupt officer holds the deconfliction on a drug dealer, he will be alerted if 
another officer tries to open an investigation on that dealer; he can then prevent the other 
investigation or alert the dealer about the investigation.  
3. Joint Investigation by the Department of Justice and Department of 
Homeland Security 
The Offices of the Inspector General (OIG) for DOJ and DHS released a joint report 
that highlights the lack of cooperation between the FBI and Homeland Security 
Investigations (HSI) at the SWB. The joint OIG report defines cooperation as 
“deconflicting investigative targets to avoid duplicative investigations, deconflicting law 
enforcement operations to promote officer safety, and sharing relevant investigative 
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information.”113 The investigators used anonymous surveys and interviews of agents 
assigned to the region to gather data for the report.114 The report shows that inconsistent 
deconfliction practices, a lack of guidance from the agencies, and a misunderstanding of 
different agencies’ federal authority have led to a decrease in information sharing, 
collaboration, and, most importantly, trust between the two agencies.115  
The vast SWB region presents significant challenges to law enforcement, and 
effective information sharing and deconfliction is paramount. The SWB spans nearly 2,000 
miles and is the main conduit for narcotics smuggling into the United States. Almost 3,000 
federal agents from the FBI and HSI conduct investigations in this region of the United 
States.116 Despite their distinct missions, both agencies share some overlapping authority 
in certain criminal matters, such as narcotics smuggling and human trafficking. Their 
investigations may cross jurisdictions, so information sharing and collaboration are 
essential in identifying overlapping investigations. The high concentration of personnel 
from these two agencies is exacerbated by the other federal, state, and local law 
enforcement agencies. 
The agent surveys from the report provide a better picture of how law enforcement 
agencies are cooperating with each other and the obstacles they encounter. Survey 
respondents answered questions about their experiences with target deconfliction, event 
deconfliction, and information sharing.117 The survey generated 980 responses from the 
2,948 agents in the SWB region. Of the 980 agents who participated in the survey, 363 (37 
percent) had at least one experience with cooperation failure.118 According to the report, 
207 out of the 363 agents who experienced at least one deconfliction failure felt that the 
most significant impact was a loss of trust in the other agency.119 Only 343 (35 percent) 
 
113 Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, 1. 
114 Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, 3. 
115 Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, 2. 
116 Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, 1. 
117 Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, 8. 
118 Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, 8. 
119 Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, 8. 
26 
of the agents believed that the FBI and HSI had a good working relationship at the SWB.120 
Likewise, 416 (43 percent) of the respondents were comfortable sharing information with 
the other agency. This is similar to the results for operational deconfliction, 511 or (53 
percent), and target deconfliction, 482 (50 percent).121 These survey responses may be 
skewed by the answers from agents that work in a task force setting. Agents in co-located, 
task forces reported more of an increase in cooperation and information sharing than agents 
working just with their own agency. The task force agents attribute this increase to the 
shared mission aspect of the task force and the personal relationships with their 
coworkers.122 
The report shows that even in a target-rich environment like the SWB, target and 
enforcement overlaps are common. Agents will independently develop information on an 
investigative subject. Agents reported target overlaps with another agency in 44 percent of 
cases, and almost one-third (29 percent) of agents reported enforcement operation 
overlap.123 The significant occurrences of overlap in both targets and operations indicate 
the necessity for a robust deconfliction system policy. Survey respondents indicated that 
they would take steps to deconflict properly if made aware of the conflict.124 Besides the 
loss of trust in the agency or its personnel, agents reported that the failure to deconflict and 
share information resulted in lower morale, prolonged investigations, compromised 
confidential sources, and compromised agent safety.125 
Although the FBI and HSI have policies that address deconfliction procedures, their 
policies can lead to confusion for the agents. In response to the joint OIG report, the FBI 
concurred with the recommendation to review its deconfliction procedures for the SWB. 
The FBI also plans to replace its regional policy procedure with an agency-level policy due 
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to the multi-jurisdictional nature of FBI investigations.126 Considering the need for 
uniformity with its deconfliction policy, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), 
which is HSI’s parent agency, stated that investigations may extend beyond the SWB and 
may affect multiple offices, and regional deconfliction policy may restrict information 
sharing and affect investigations and officer safety.127 The policy mandates that all agents 
use DEA’s DICE system as well as the local or regional systems, regardless of their 
assignment and geographic location.128  
The survey highlighted several issues needed to improve deconfliction and 
information sharing between the FBI and HSI. A clear agency policy needs to be developed 
for deconfliction and sharing information.129 A proper policy from each agency is also 
necessary and must be conveyed and understood by all the federal investigators. Also 
necessary to increase information sharing and deconfliction compliance are improvements 
to information sharing systems, alignment of investigative procedures, and compliance 
with established deconfliction protocols.130 This policy, coupled with the proper 
technology, can significantly benefit law enforcement. The surveys complied with the 
report provide an understanding of agency interactions and the shortfalls of current policies 
and systems. 
G. CONCLUSION 
Proper deconfliction in law enforcement is necessary for officer safety and 
information sharing, and complex investigations require cooperation among multiple 
agencies. The current use of multiple deconfliction systems among the vast number of law 
enforcement officers and agencies is inefficient and, without policy governing their use, 
officers are confused about how and when to use deconfliction. As the joint OIG survey 
indicates, failure to properly deconflict investigations also causes officers to lose trust in 
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each other and in other agencies. This loss of trust leads to a breakdown in information 
sharing and collaboration, which  harms investigations and leads to conflicting cases and 
competition. A single deconfliction system may bridge some of these gaps and allow for 
greater cooperation.  
The following chapters examine several high-profile investigations that were 
affected by deconfliction issues. They highlight how communication between agencies as 
a result of a deconfliction meeting can improve information sharing and collaboration on 
investigations. One case review shows that the refusal to cooperate, share information, and 




III. OPERATION FAST AND FURIOUS  
Operation Fast and Furious was an ATF-led investigation of firearms trafficking 
into Mexico, undertaken to arrest drug cartels leaders. The investigation attempted to track 
the firearms and the subjects through a Title III federal wiretap warrant. A primary 
component of the investigation was for law enforcement to allow the firearms to leave the 
United States and enter Mexico without interdiction; investigators hoped this would help 
them identify all members of the operation. As such, they allowed drug cartel agents to 
purchase nearly 2,000 high-powered firearms.  
Deconfliction meetings between agencies to discuss crossover investigative targets 
can facilitate information sharing; in the case of Operation Fast and Furious, it resulted in 
the creation of a dedicated task force. Even with these meetings, however, information 
sharing still requires all parties to act honestly. If task force members do not share all their 
information with other members, or if they limit team members’ involvement, the 
investigation will not be successful. 
While some agencies worked well together on this investigation, there were many 
instances of failure to share information, turf protection, and refusal to collaborate. Agents 
also used technology to limit information sharing and therefore inhibit other agencies’ 
investigations. Operation Fast and Furious eventually led to the death of Border Patrol 
Agent Brian Terry, who was killed by a firearms trafficker armed with one of the 2,000 
guns in question.  
This case review of Operation Fast and Furious was compiled from government 
reports from the DOJ and DHS, and it highlights successful examples of information 
sharing, deconfliction, and collaboration; more importantly, however, it highlights failures 
in these areas. This case study does not examine the investigative methodology unless it 
was affected by the agents and supervisors who refused to share information or deconflict 
with an outside agency. The investigation’s failures were caused by the strategy of the case 




One suspicious firearm purchase set in motion the investigation that would become 
known as Operation Fast and Furious. On October 31, 2009, a local federal firearms license 
(FFL) holder notified the ATF’s Phoenix Field Division about a suspicious firearm 
purchase, which initiated the investigation. The buyer, Jacob Chambers, had purchased six 
AK-47-style firearms at one time, with cash. The FFL holder reported this suspicious 
purchase, and the notification to the ATF led to the case against Jacob Chambers et al., 
which would become Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Strike Force Operation Fast and 
Furious.132 Other FFL holders alerted the ATF to additional suspicious firearms sales 
made from November 1 through November 6 by new subjects. Although the lead case 
agent established an official case as required by ATF guidelines, she and her supervisors 
decided on a course of action that would prove very dangerous to the citizens of Mexico 
and to U.S. law enforcement.133 During the next month, using conventional investigative 
techniques, suspect surveillance, and information supplied by the FFL holders, the ATF 
agents established a connection between the different straw buyers and possible stash 
locations.134  
The ATF and the FFL holders in the Phoenix area already had a friendly 
relationship marked by reporting of suspicious purchases. To thoroughly investigate the 
organization and the cartel connection, the ATF capitalized on this relationship and 
requested that the FFL holders fulfill any firearms purchase request, thus allowing the 
numerous firearms to go to Mexico. The FFLs then notified the ATF team in advance of 
the purchases, allowing the ATF to conduct surveillance on the purchasers. One 
cooperating FFL holder allowed the ATF to install surveillance cameras in his store so the 
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ATF could remotely monitor transactions.135 The FFL holders’ cooperation was 
instrumental to the investigation. 
However, the ATF’s investigation strategy was inconsistent with a standard policy: 
The lead case agent and her supervisors chose not to interdict the firearms because they 
believed this course of action would alert the traffickers and financers to a law enforcement 
investigation.136 Case agents conducted surveillance and identified additional suspects and 
stash locations but did not perform any proactive policing. Although the lead agent and the 
supervisors decided that a Title III wiretap investigation would allow them to identify the 
cartel connected to the firearms, this type of investigation was time-consuming; it 
prolonged the investigation and, moreover, differed from standard ATF methods.137 The 
ATF’s common investigative technique was to have the investigator conduct a “knock and 
talk” to interview the straw buyer and attempt to obtain a confession, then use the straw 
buyer as a cooperator against the trafficker.138 The lead case agent and her supervisors felt 
that these arrests would not be fruitful, however, because they would not take down the 
entire organization.139 
The Phoenix Field Division created a new team, Team VII, that brought in agents 
from other states for the investigation, and law enforcement authorities along both sides of 
the SWB started recovering firearms trafficked into Mexico. On November 20, 2009, in 
the Naco, Sanora, region, Mexican soldiers arrested three individuals and recovered forty-
two firearms, nineteen of which were bought by Fast and Furious subjects earlier in the 
month.140 This weapons seizure identified additional Fast and Furious subjects, and 
members of the HSI interviewed the arrested individuals from that seizure. To protect their 
investigation and avoid alerting the gun traffickers who were being investigated, the 
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Special Agent in Charge for ATF Phoenix Field Division advised HSI to stop its 
investigation and not interview other people arrested for firearms trafficking.141 The ATF 
scheduled a deconfliction meeting with HSI for November 30, 2009. Deconfliction 
meetings between the two agencies were routine, as investigations between the agencies 
frequently overlapped. During the deconfliction meeting, HSI agreed to stop their firearms 
trafficking investigations related to the Naco, Mexico, seizures, as the Assistant United 
States Attorney supported the ATF’s investigation.142 HSI Phoenix assigned one special 
agent to the investigation to assist the ATF and promote information sharing between the 
two agencies. 
To track the firearms in an investigation and control the release of the information, 
the ATF records information about firearms purchases electronically. As part of her 
investigation, the lead agent entered the serial numbers of the firearms into the ATF 
Suspect Guns Database. ATF agents use the Suspect Gun Database to track firearms they 
believe have been trafficked or purchased by straw buyers.143 To prevent other law 
enforcement agencies from talking to subjects of her investigation, the lead agent for Fast 
and Furious requested that the National Tracing Center not release any information related 
to her firearms without her approval.144  
The lead case agent used agency deconfliction systems to protect other agents and 
determine whether other investigations involved her targets. In November 2009, the lead 
ATF agent requested that a DEA analyst run six telephone numbers related to Fast and 
Furious subjects in its DICE deconfliction system.145 This initial request by the lead agent 
led to negative results for deconfliction.146 On December 14, 2009, a DEA agent 
conducting a narcotics investigation with the FBI received information from his Title III 
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wiretap investigation that one of his subjects met a person about a firearms deal.147 During 
surveillance, the DEA agent observed his subject with a person he later identified as Jacob 
Chambers, the Fast and Furious investigation’s original subject.148 Computer and 
deconfliction checks conducted by the DEA agent showed that an ATF agent registered 
Jacob Chambers; because of this conflict, the DEA and FBI set up a separate deconfliction 
meeting with the ATF. 
The DEA and the ATF held a deconfliction meeting to discuss the crossover 
between the two investigations. During the meeting, the DEA provided the ATF with all 
the information that they had on Manual Celis-Acosta, the ATF’s current main subject.149 
Celis-Acosta was in contact with the DEA investigation subject and discussed the sale of 
firearms and money transfers.150 The ATF did not act on the information provided by the 
DEA about Celis-Acosta because they claim the DEA asked them not to. The DEA refutes 
this explanation, however, because the subject was only tangentially related to the DEA 
case and would not affect their investigation. While the ATF did not contact or investigate 
Celis-Acosta, the DEA’s information was essential to the ATF’s wiretap warrants, issued 
later on, in March 2010.151 The DEA information would have shortened the investigation 
and reduced the danger to the public, as it would have prevented the need for the Title III 
investigation.152  
The pace of the firearms purchases began to worry some of the FFL holders. On 
December 17, 2009, the FFL holder who had sold the most guns during the investigation 
requested a meeting with the ATF agents because of the unprecedented number of firearms 
purchased. At the meeting, the ATF agents assured the FFL holder that they were 
surveilling the subjects and doing everything possible to retrieve the firearms.153 During 
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the meeting, the ATF agents asked the FFL holder to record phone conversations with the 
subjects and asked if they could install a surveillance camera in the store to monitor the 
sales.154 Being assured that the ATF was doing what it could to interdict the guns and 
prevent them from going to Mexico, the FFL holder agreed to their request. 
One week after the deconfliction meeting, the DEA provided the ATF case agent 
with information about a transfer of firearms between Celis-Acosta and another party 
heading to Mexico. The DEA did not act on this information because it did not have a 
narcotics component in the exchange.155 The ATF case agent also did not act on the DEA’s 
information because, being so close to Christmas, there were not enough agents to conduct 
the surveillance for the exchange, and the ATF agent did not believe the subject was going 
to meet with the other party for the firearms exchange. This information, about the 
Christmas gun shipment provided by the DEA, was the most substantial evidence in the 
investigation tying Celis-Acosta to the Mexican cartels, but the ATF did not act on it. 
Specific federal investigations are deemed a higher priority and receive a special 
designation. In February 2010, the ATF submitted the Fast and Furious investigation for 
Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task-Force (OCDETF) approval.156 The OCDETF 
designation provided the case investigators with increased funding, additional resources, 
and personnel, along with greater prestige for the agency. The OCDETF proposal 
submitted to the review committee indicated that the Fast and Furious investigations were 
being handled by a multiagency task force led by the ATF, with additional personnel 
provided by HSI, the DEA, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and the local police 
department as task force officers.157 Because of the OCDETF designation, Team VII 
moved its offices to the OCDETF Strike Force headquarters, giving the team greater access 
to other agencies and information for their investigation.  
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Celis-Acosta had several interactions with the police, but the ATF did not attempt 
to gain his cooperation against the cartels. On May 29, 2010, the Lukeville, Arizona, Port 
of Entry Customs and Border Protection (CBP) stopped Celis-Acosta and found him in 
possession of an AK-47 drum-style magazine and seventy-four rounds of ammunition. A 
computer check by the CBP officer indicated that Celis-Acosta was the subject of an 
investigation, and he contacted the lead case agent.158 The agent responded to the location 
to interview Celis-Acosta but did not obtain any useful information. Upon Celis-Acosta’s 
release from the location, the agent provided him with her phone number, but he never 
called her. 
In March 2010, the ATF received approval for the Title III wiretap warrant for the 
Fast and Furious subjects. In applying for the warrant, the ATF used the information the 
DEA had supplied during the deconfliction meeting in December 2009.159 The ATF 
renewed the Title III warrant every thirty days until August 2010. During that time, the 
ATF continued its same investigative strategy and allowed firearms trafficking into Mexico 
without interdiction, out of fear that interdicting the firearms shipments would cause the 
subject to change phone numbers.160 During the Title III wiretap monitoring, the ATF did 
not identify any additional subjects and received no new information about their existing 
subjects, other than the information provided by the DEA in December. In August the ATF 
discontinued Title III because it added no value to the investigation. The ATF continued 
with the investigation for several more months even though ATF headquarters in 
Washington, DC, requested an exit strategy.161 
By December 2010, almost 2,000 firearms had been allowed to enter Mexico and 
the operation had identified dozens of subjects and the main trafficker. On December 14, 
2010, in the Rio Rico region of Arizona, Border Patrol Agent Brian Terry was killed in a 
shootout with Mexican smugglers. The weapon that killed Agent Terry, and another gun 
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found at the scene, had been purchased by Fast and Furious straw buyers in the very early 
stages of the Fast and Furious investigation.162 As a result of Terry’s murder, the ATF 
conducted an emergency case takedown; in January 2011, they arrested twenty members 
of the straw buying ring. The indictment of the ring members did not contain additional 
evidence obtained during the Title III investigation.163 Although law enforcement 
recovered 567 of the nearly 2,000 firearms trafficked into Mexico, the Fast and Furious 
investigative team only recovered 105 firearms.164 Police and federal agents recovered the 
remaining 462 firearms while conducting their regular duties, usually at crime scenes or as 
the result of search warrants or car stops—putting their lives in great danger.165 
B. DECONFLICTION 
At the beginning of the Fast and Furious investigation, the ATF conducted several 
target deconfliction meetings with other law enforcement agencies. These deconfliction 
meetings allowed the agencies to exchange information and reassign personnel to help with 
the investigation. The first deconfliction meeting took place between ATF and HSI over 
the Naco, Mexico, firearms seizure; because this seizure occurred in Mexico, HSI had 
jurisdiction to investigate under the Arms Export Control Act.166 During the deconfliction 
meeting, the ATF took the lead on the investigation and HSI assigned an agent to assist 
with deconfliction and information sharing. The HSI special agent in charge agreed to this 
because he had been instructed by his leadership at Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE), his parent agency, to foster a better working relationship with the ATF. To facilitate 
this cooperation, in June 2009, ICE and ATF signed a memorandum of understanding 
(MOU) that mandated the sharing of information between the two agencies and the 
correction of disputes at the lowest management level.167 The direction by management 
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and the creation of official agreements facilitating information sharing among agencies 
echoes Riege’s work, which describes senior management’s responsibility to foster 
communication to achieve its goals.168 The MOU between the two agencies also served to 
overcome the traditional law enforcement need-to-know mentality described by Bhasker 
and Zhang; MOUs can help reduce turf wars between agencies, allowing the agencies to 
build trust.169  
Because the DICE deconfliction systems were used properly, both the ATF and 
DEA were alerted that Jacob Chambers was connected to the agencies’ separate 
investigations. The deconfliction meeting took place because the agents correctly followed 
procedures and used their deconfliction systems. The lead ATF agent had all the telephone 
numbers for her subject researched in DICE by a DEA analyst, which resulted in no conflict 
for the subjects. A short while later, the DEA agent, working on a separate investigation, 
identified a new person who was talking to his drug suspect about firearms. The agent again 
followed the procedure and submitted the new subject’s information into DICE, which 
conflicted with the ATF agent’s registration. The proper use of the DICE system prevented 
a possible event conflict and promoted information sharing between the two agencies. 
Because both the ATF and DEA agents properly deconflicted their subjects, they 
were able to meet in person and share their case information. The deconfliction meeting 
provided the ATF agent with the name of the chief firearms trafficker for the Fast and 
Furious investigation. While the ATF did not use this information, the exchange was a 
positive result of proper deconfliction policies. The meeting also allowed the agents to 
properly deconflict the information they provided DEA. The DEA asked the ATF to inform 
them if they were going to take action against the individual discussed. 
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C. INFORMATION SHARING 
Operation Fast and Furious was able to begin in the first place thanks to information 
sharing between the FFL holders and the ATF. In 2009, the sale of multiple long guns in a 
short period did not require a notification to the ATF; however, because FFL holders in 
Arizona had a good working relationship with the ATF and a concern for public safety, 
they provided a constant stream of information to the ATF. The notifications about planned 
purchases and the installation of real-time surveillance cameras in the store underscore how 
much the FFL holders helped the ATF. One FFL holder stated that he participated in the 
operation because of the number of friends he had in law enforcement.170 Another created 
a worksheet for his employees to use when an identified straw buyer made a purchase; it 
contained all of the information about the transaction, and it was faxed it to the ATF.171 
As the investigation continued, the FFL holders became concerned about the 
number of firearms purchased and the length of the investigation.172 The ATF insisted, 
however, that the information derived from the sales was essential to the investigation, so 
the FFL holders continued cooperating, even though some felt it was becoming 
dangerous.173 One FFL holder even recorded phone conversations with a straw buyer for 
the ATF to use as evidence. The FFL holders, all the while, believed that the ATF was 
interdicting the weapons; the ATF did not inform the FFL holders that they were allowing 
the guns to walk. The ATF implied they were doing everything possible to seize the 
firearms and prevent them from going to Mexico. Had they not, the FFL holders might 
have refused to sell the firearms to the straw buyers and abruptly ended the 
investigation.174  
The ATF agent’s reluctance to use the DEA’s information shows a lack of trust in 
the agency, or at least the agent. Upon learning of the deconfliction issue on the case, the 
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DEA talked to the lead ATF agent. The DEA provided information about the main 
trafficker, Celis-Acosta, and the Christmas weapons transfer, neither of which the ATF 
used. The ATF agent may have refused initially to use the DEA information because of 
institutional friction; both the DEA and the ATF targeted Mexican drug cartels and did not 
want the competition. The DEA agent provided pertinent information to the ATF in hopes 
that doing so would build trust with the agent for future information exchanges. 
The DEA, HSI, and CBP voluntarily shared information with the ATF at the 
deconfliction meetings in November and December 2009. The ATF, however, actively 
tried to prevent information about the case from being shared with the other agencies. 
Technology was used to hinder information sharing when the lead ATF agent used the 
Suspect Guns Database to block information about the recovered firearms. The improper 
use of technology, or the use of the incorrect technology, is a barrier to effective 
information sharing, according to Riege.175 Registering the firearms in the Suspect Gun 
Database allows law enforcement to trace firearms recovered at a crime scene or from a 
seizure to their original point of sale. To protect her investigation, the lead agent would not 
release any information about the recovered firearms; she would state to any requestor that 
it was part of an ongoing ATF investigation. By not releasing this information to the outside 
agencies, the Fast and Furious investigation’s true scope was unknown to other agencies. 
CBP notified the lead case agent of Celis-Acosta’s arrest on May 29, 2010, which allowed 
the lead agent to interview him. While the agent acted on the information very quickly, she 
did not obtain Celis-Acosta’s cooperation or even arrest him for the firearms trafficking. 
Also listed with the firearm information in the Suspect Guns Database is the related 
case information and case number. The case agents list their name and contact information 
to allow direct communication about a possible case connection. This is designed to save 
the investigator time; it allows instant access to the history of the firearm without running 
a full check through the National Tracing Center.176 This information will also allow the 
person requesting the eTrace to have direct contact with the other ATF agent assigned to 
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the case.177 Direct contact allows both investigations to proceed, allows the ATF to see 
how vast the trafficking network is, and helps the requestor determine the origin of the gun. 
Investigators not assigned to the ATF must contact the National Tracing Center to obtain 
the case agent’s information.178 
D. COLLABORATION 
The ATF created a new investigative team, Team VII, to conduct Operation Fast 
and Furious, and for the first time a firearms trafficking investigation received an OCDETF 
designation.179 OCDETF-funded cases increase collaboration and information sharing 
because they include more law enforcement agencies in a task force setting; the ATF agents 
controlled the investigative information provided to those agencies and limited their 
involvement.180 According to a report by the DHS OIG, the ATF supervisors did not allow 
the HSI agent to participate in internal meetings regarding the investigation, even though 
the HSI agent was named co-lead; the ATF excluded him from attending specific case 
meetings, preventing him from offering his ideas.181 By controlling the information to 
outside agencies, the ATF allowed many high-powered firearms to reach the hands of 
violent criminals, leading to the death of Border Patrol Agent Terry. 
Although collaboration between agencies may be necessary for an investigation, it 
does not always work. The HSI agent was assigned to Fast and Furious to facilitate 
deconfliction and information sharing about seizures.182 The special agent in charge stated 
that his other reason for assigning the HSI agent was that ICE asked HSI to cooperate with 
ATF on investigations in the region.183 During this portion of the investigation, executives, 
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on several occasions, fostered collaborative work environments by adding resources and 
agents to the investigation. The meeting between HSI and ATF was an attempt to overcome 
turf protection—a barrier to collaboration, according to Busuioc.184 The need for 
additional resources and the addition of the HSI agent outweighed the ATF’s reluctance to 
work collaboratively on the investigation. Additionally, the MOU between the ATF and 
ICE, and the instructions from ICE executives to work with the ATF, reflect Riege’s 
statement that senior management needs to communicate its goals to employees if 
employees are to buy into the information sharing.185  
Unfortunately, this assignment of an HSI agent to the investigation did not help 
HIS produce any significant information. To protect its investigation, the ATF fought 
against collaboration with HSI. For instance, the ATF case agent did not provide the HSI 
agent with information about the Naco, Mexico, gun seizure, and they limited his 
surveillance assignments to restrict his knowledge of the investigation. Without full 
information and with limited surveillance duties, the agent was not able to pass information 
to the HSI field office in Arizona. To improve its access to information about the Fast And 
Furious investigation, the HSI field office assigned a senior special agent to act as a liaison. 
Although this agent was an expert in firearms trafficking in the SWB region, the ATF did 
not give the agent specifics about the investigation, choosing to build silos. These actions 
increased the barriers to information sharing and collaboration between the two agencies, 
breeding an us-versus-them culture. 
E. CONCLUSION  
Operation Fast and Furious had many flaws; in the end, the flaws proved fatal for 
Border Patrol Agent Brian Terry. Although some key features of information sharing and 
collaboration were championed, others were ignored and abused. ATF investigators 
ignored information provided by other agencies because of a lack of trust. Even when the 
ATF collaborated with outside agencies in a task force environment, the ATF limited 
information sharing and the other agencies’ participation in the case. The ATF also used 
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technology designed to facilitate information sharing to prevent law enforcement, and the 
public, from learning the number of firearms it allowed to travel into Mexico. 
Conversely, the FBI, DEA, and HSI attempted to facilitate information sharing 
during the investigation. All of the agencies participated in deconfliction meetings with the 
ATF about the recovered firearms and possible case subjects. The special agent in charge 
for HSI Arizona supplied an agent to the ATF in hopes of better communication between 
the two agencies, following executives’ instructions to collaborate with the ATF. The DEA 
and FBI provided information from their investigation regarding a Fast and Furious subject 
they had identified during a normal deconfliction process, and about a man who was 
eventually identified as the primary subject. ATF agents failed to respond to the DEA’s 
information about a weapons shipment, which may have ended the case long before Terry’s 
death. A combination of institutional friction, abuse of technology, and groupthink 
unnecessarily prolonged the investigation. 
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IV. ROSS ULBRICHT AND THE SILK ROAD 
The internet has allowed criminals to expand their illegal activities in ways never 
thought possible. Because of the internet, child pornography exploded: over 70 million 
files are shared each year.186 The internet has also become fertile ground for identity theft, 
with cases increasing by more than 100 percent between 2010 and 2015.187 Dealing drugs, 
however, was initially more difficult on the internet because sellers and buyers needed to 
exchange money for the product, and buyers could not trust the dealers or keep their 
identities safe from law enforcement. This case study examines the Silk Road, a dark 
website where people could sell almost anything illegal. The investigation of the website 
presented new challenges to law enforcement that would require them to share information 
among investigative groups across the country and eventually collaborate and target the 
organization’s leader.  
This case study focuses on the investigation into the Silk Road website by the 
federal agencies—HSI, FBI, and IRS—whose collaboration led to the identification of its 
founder, Ross Ulbricht. This chapter discusses how Ulbricht built the Silk Road and an 
online drug empire and highlights the difficulties law enforcement encountered during the 
investigation thanks to the technology that allowed the website to succeed. The chapter 
also discusses a meeting organized by the DOJ that gave all the investigative agencies a 
chance to present their evidence. Without the information sharing facilitated by this 
meeting, the Silk Road would have continued operating and Ulbricht might never have 
been identified or prosecuted by the DOJ  
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In January 2011, twenty-six-year-old Ross Ulbricht launched the Silk Road, a 
website hidden on the dark web and designed for contraband material transactions—the 
eBay of drugs. Ulbricht, known to site users as the Dread Pirate Roberts (DPR), envisioned 
a libertarian society where people could indulge in any drug they wished without 
government interference. A former doctoral candidate in physics at Penn State University, 
he capitalized on new technologies such as Tor, Bitcoin, and the dark web to covertly 
launch his new enterprise. The website allowed users to distribute drugs worldwide, 
upending typical drug distribution models and avoiding law enforcement efforts to stop the 
illegal flow of drugs. Even with the immense popularity of the website and calls from 
Congress for its seizure, law enforcement could not identify who, or where, DPR was. It 
took the combined efforts of multiple law enforcement agencies, sharing information and 
working together, to identify and apprehend DPR. 
Ulbricht believed that the street dealing of narcotics leads to violent crime and user 
victimization, with most drug deals happening in poor neighborhoods, and with users at 
risk of violence and arrest by law enforcement. If he could develop a way to distribute 
drugs to people that kept the end user safe from violence and arrest, he believed society 
would improve. The Silk Road website, a marketplace for the distribution of illegal 
narcotics to anyone in the world, intended to do just that; its chat room and customer 
feedback system developed into a large online community that allowed for the free trade 
of information on how to buy, sell, and ingest drugs, and on which dealers were the most 
reputable and had the best product. It also provided Ulbricht a platform to discuss his 
libertarian beliefs.189  
The key to the Silk Road’s secrecy was its security measures, which protected the 
users and vendors while hampering law enforcement’s efforts. The Silk Road operated on 
the dark web, a large portion of the internet that is not accessible through conventional 
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search engines like Google Chrome or Safari, which search only the clearnet.190 Access to 
the dark web is only possible with specific search engines that hide the user’s information. 
To access the Silk Road on the dark web, users need to download and use Tor, a search 
engine initially designed by the United States Navy to protect overseas operatives and 
political dissidents by masking the user’s IP address.191 Using Tor on the dark web, a 
person in New York, for example, can appear to be in South Africa. Tor became available 
to the general public in 2004 and is widely used to protect illegal online activities.192 The 
site users are protected from law enforcement surveillance because investigators can only 
conduct word and phrase searches on clearnet search engines.193 
To increase site security, Ulbricht required customers to use the new, anonymous 
cryptocurrency Bitcoin. Created in 2009, Bitcoin is a peer-to-peer electronic payment 
system that cuts out a third-party money manager like a bank or credit card company, which 
must report suspicious transactions to law enforcement for investigation.194 The 
blockchain records all Bitcoin transactions on anonymous public ledgers between buyers 
and sellers; the ledger allows the seller to verify that that the buyer did not already spend 
the electronic currency.195 Because the blockchain is a public record, investigators can 
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trace all transactions a person has made if they know the person’s account number. Bitcoin 
allowed the Silk Road to flourish and the Silk Road symbiotically launched Bitcoin’s 
acceptance as a currency. 
While the Silk Road was growing quietly in the dark web community, it would soon 
gain worldwide notoriety. To spread the word about the website while remaining 
anonymous, Ulbricht—using the screenname Altoid—posted to a website for psychedelic 
mushrooms called Shroomery.com, asking if its users had heard about the Silk Road.196 
This post and another post on a website called Bitcoin talk, also from Altoid, were the first 
mentions of the Silk Road recorded on the internet. To publicize his philosophical views 
and explain how the government was wrong to deny people access to drugs, Ulbricht also 
cooperated anonymously with the website Gawker. Adrien Chen, an experienced blogger 
for the site, published his article on June 1, 2011, entitled “The Underground website 
Where You Can Buy Anything,” announced the Silk Road to the world.197 Publicity from 
the article generated thousands of new sales on the Silk Road, making Ulbricht very 
wealthy and drawing the federal government’s attention. Senator Charles Schumer of New 
York and Senator Joseph Manchin of West Virginia called on the DOJ and DEA to shut 
down the site.198  
Law enforcement was aware of the Silk Road website, however, before the Gawker 
article was published. During the winter of 2011, rookie HSI Chicago Agent Jared Der-
Yeghiayan began looking into the Silk Road from the evidence recovered at the Chicago 
International Mail Center. The Silk Road’s vendors exploited the international mail system 
to deliver its drugs; Der-Yeghiayan compared seized drug shipments from the mail facility 
to images of drugs advertised on the Silk Road to identify and arrest customers, who he 
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then compelled to work with law enforcement.199 This strategy eventually allowed law 
enforcement to confirm that Ross Ulbricht was DPR. 
Chicago was not the only city investigating the Silk Road. In March 2011, HSI 
Baltimore formed the Marco Polo task force with the DEA to investigate and dismantle the 
Silk Road, using an undercover operation online to amass evidence. A key component of 
the investigation was the arrest of a Silk Road dealer who, when forced to cooperate with 
law enforcement, helped investigators target other dealers on the site.200 Additionally, the 
DEA agent assigned to the investigation posed online as a Dominican drug dealer using 
the screenname Nob, and contacted DPR directly. Nob became friendly with DPR through 
multiple online chats, during which he advised DPR about how to avoid government 
investigations and how to obtain fake identification so he could hide his true identity if he 
needed to flee the country.201 Nob did not document all of these conversations in case files. 
Because of this close relationship, DPR agreed to help facilitate a kilo sale of cocaine for 
Nob, which resulted in the arrest of Silk Road employee Curtis Green. Green would later 
present evidence against DPR and the Silk Road and serve as the principal witness for the 
Maryland U.S. Attorney’s Office in its John Doe indictment of DPR. Nob, however, was 
having financial troubles in his personal life; his relationship with DPR led to several illegal 
transactions and his eventual arrest and conviction.202  
Because HSI led two of the early Silk Road investigations, in the spring of 2012 
the Chicago and Baltimore field offices held a contentious deconfliction meeting in 
Chicago.203 During the meeting, the HSI Baltimore contingent declared that it would take 
the lead on the investigation because of the cooperating dealer. A heated discussion about 
the investigation ensued, which prevented the teams from sharing information or agreeing 
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to collaborate. The supervisors and prosecutors protected their own agents and their 
separate investigations; the supervisors yielded that they would deconflict targets when 
necessary, but they would not work together.204 
One of the greatest contributions to the Silk Road investigation came from the FBI 
New York Field Office. The field office’s cyber crimes squad started its investigation of 
the Silk Road by analyzing the computer traffic on the site, ignoring the dealers and 
customers who used it.205 As the lead investigator for the FBI explained, his team was able 
to discover the location of the Silk Road server because, even though the server operated 
on the Tor network, the programmer (Ulbricht) did not configure the website’s applications 
for Tor. This meant that when customers logged into the website, their IP addresses were 
leaked.206 This allowed the FBI to determine that the Silk Road server was leased from a 
web hosting company and located in Iceland.207 With the assistance of the Reykjavík 
Metropolitan Police, the FBI received a copy of the imaged server on July 29, 2013, 
allowing the team to begin their forensic examination.208 
The multiple investigations into the Silk Road still had not identified DPR, nor were 
they able to take down the website. To rectify this situation and analyze all evidence from 
the different investigative agencies, the DOJ called for a deconfliction meeting in July 
2013. In addition to analyzing the evidence from all the investigations, the DOJ planned to 
use the meeting to determine which unit would lead the investigation and which U.S. 
attorney’s office would prosecute. The meeting was hosted by a chief from the DOJ 
Criminal Division and required the different investigators and prosecutors to present their 
evidence. Each unit spoke in turn; however, HSI Baltimore refused to supply any 
information, stating its case had already gone to a grand jury for the John Doe 
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indictment.209 Additionally, before the meeting, HSI Baltimore warned Agent Der-
Yeghiayan not to talk about his evidence out of fear that the FBI would attempt to take 
over his investigation.210  
Unlike HSI Baltimore, however, the other teams at the meeting did share 
information. At the end of the meeting, the FBI informed the room that its team had a copy 
of the Silk Road server. As a result of the deconfliction meeting, the FBI decided that it 
would work with HSI Chicago to identify DPR and seize the Silk Road website. The 
sharing of the server information allowed other agencies to seek FBI assistance with their 
separate investigations. Gary Alford, an IRS-Criminal Investigator assigned to the DEA 
Strike Force, went to the FBI to analyze the server for his separate money-laundering 
investigation into the Silk Road. While at the FBI office, he and Der-Yeghiavan discovered 
that the server was once accessed from a bistro in San Francisco, indicating that DPR lived 
in or had visited San Francisco. Upon learning this, Alford informed the FBI agent that he 
had a possible subject in San Francisco. However, the FBI agent did not have faith in the 
information.  
Also as a result of the deconfliction meeting, Der-Yeghiayan went to New York to 
work undercover with the FBI; by arresting dealers and monitoring Silk Road discussion 
forums, they able to identify DPR and, more importantly, secure his laptop. While Der-
Yeghiayan was engaging in such discussions, he became friends with a person named 
Cirrus. Der-Yeghiayan located Cirrus’s address and performed a knock and talk to discuss 
her activity on the illegal website.211 As a result of this meeting Cirrus agreed to work with 
the investigators and allowed them to impersonate her on the website. Because Cirrus was 
a paid administrator for the Silk Road, this gave investigators access to all of the discussion 
forums.212 Der-Yeghiayan took over Cirrus’s account and monitored system 
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administrators’ discussions, allowing him to see when DPR was accessing the server. 
Cirrus also gave Der-Yeghiayan screenshots of DPR’s posts so Agent Der-Yeghiayan 
could understand Cirrus’s history on the site and identify DPR by his writing style.213  
Meanwhile, as his site became increasingly popular, Ulbricht became increasingly 
paranoid. Following Nob’s advice, Ulbricht prepared to leave the country. In July 2013, to 
facilitate his life of obscurity, Ulbricht ordered nine fake driver’s licenses from a vendor 
on the Silk Road.214 The new IDs were intercepted by CBP and handed over to DHS for 
an investigation. On July 26, 2013, two agents from DHS went to the address listed on the 
fake ID envelopes to talk to the person who had purchased them. The agents met and 
interviewed Ulbricht and explained that they were not there to arrest him but wanted to 
know how he obtained the fake IDs. Ulbricht calmly explained that he was very protective 
of his privacy and had bought them on the Silk Road, explaining how to access it and use 
Bitcoin.215 After positively identifying Ulbricht through his Texas driver’s license, the 
agents ended the interview, returned to their office, and documented the interview with 
Ulbricht’s real name and address on the report.  
In late July, when the Marco Polo Task force learned that the FBI had the Silk Road 
server, the DEA’s undercover agent, Nob, became anxious. For the previous few months, 
Nob had been communicating with DPR using pretty good protection (PGP) encryption 
and had not been documenting the conversations.216 Nob encrypted these conversations 
because he was sharing case information with DPR in exchange for Bitcoin, and the DEA 
agent was fearful that non-encrypted information about his conversations with DPR might 
be on the server. The DEA agent attempted to gain access to the server, but the FBI denied 
him.217 When he learned that the FBI had discovered DPR’s identity, he tried to obtain the 
identity from the U.S. attorney who was prosecuting the Baltimore investigation so he 
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could warn DPR to destroy his computer.218 Nob (a DEA agent), along with a Secret 
Service agent, was eventually arrested for wire fraud, money laundering, and government 
property theft.  
Meanwhile, when the FBI did not accept Alford’s information about a possible 
subject in San Francisco, Alford began to investigate the lead again. Alford approached the 
Silk Road investigation differently; he used Google searches to examine all internet posts 
that mentioned the Silk Road, which led him to the post by Altoid on the Shroomery 
website on January 27, 2011.219 Alford reviewed all of Altoid’s posts online, on one of 
which included Altoid’s email address, rossulbricht@gmail.com.220 Next, Alford 
discovered a post—made from the username Ross Ulbrich—asking for help with Tor 
coding; after the post, the user changed his name on the site to Frosty.221 Further Google 
searches revealed information about Ulbricht’s education and libertarian views.  
After the FBI refused his assistance, Alford conducted a new computer check to 
see if Ulbricht had any contact with the police. The new search revealed the report from 
DHS agents describing the fake IDs and their intended recipient, Ross Ulbricht. This 
information lead Alford to believe that Ulbricht was a target. With the new information 
provided by Alford, the Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) discovered that 
Ulbricht’s apartment in San Francisco was only a few hundred feet from the San Francisco 
bistro that the FBI identified in its investigation. During a conference between the 
investigators and the AUSA, the FBI agent who had examined the Silk Road server stated 
that DPR named the server Frosty—the same name Ulbricht had used in his inquiry about 
Tor. Der-Yeghiayan compared the writing style of DPR’s Silk Road posts to Ulbricht’s 
public posts on Facebook and discovered that they used similar phrases writing patterns.222 
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With the new information provided by Alford, the FBI made Ross Ulbricht the lead suspect 
in the Silk Road investigation. Surveillance of Ulbricht in San Francisco confirmed his 
computer activity coincided with DPR’s. The information provided by the three different 
agencies, working together, led to Ulbricht’s arrest and the seizure of the Silk Road on 
October 2, 2013.223 
After years of separate investigations by multiple agencies, the takedown of the 
Silk Road and arrest of DPR were the result of collaboration and information sharing. The 
DOJ’s deconfliction meeting to improve the disparate investigative efforts was the catalyst. 
During its time on the dark web, the Silk Road generated almost $1.2 billion in sales and 
earned Ulbricht $80 million in commission, which the U.S. government seized through 
forfeiture.224 The dismantling of the organization resulted in arrests of several hundred 
people in forty-three different countries. Consequently, the collaboration between the 
agencies magnified the individual work done by the investigators. 
B. DECONFLICTION  
In response to lawmakers’ challenges to seize the Silk Road website and arrest the 
operator, several federal agencies began investigations into the site. HSI in Chicago and 
Baltimore conducted Silk Road investigations, along with the DEA’s Strike Force and the 
FBI in New York. While these investigations had some success separately, it was their 
information sharing and collaboration that led to the seizure of the Silk Road. Two primary 
deconfliction meetings took place during the Silk Road investigation. The first one was 
between the HSI Baltimore and Chicago offices. The meeting, which was attended by 
management and the AUSAs prosecuting the investigation, achieved nothing, as 
institutional friction and competition between the two offices prevented any form of 
collaboration. Each office wanted the prestige that came with arresting DPR and taking 
down the Silk Road. Instead of mandating that their agents work together, the separate 
supervisors supported their agents in protecting their evidence, fostering a turf war rather 
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than a working relationship over the investigation. The deconfliction meeting may even 
have hampered the investigations; the agents developed no new leads and hoarded 
information. 
The second deconfliction meeting, mandated by the DOJ, had a different result: it 
led directly to the arrest of DPR. Although the HSI Baltimore Marco Polo task force refused 
to share information to protect its investigation and indictment, the DOJ bureau chief 
convinced the other agencies to talk freely about their evidence, the most significant being 
that the FBI had the Silk Road server. The units’ willingness to share their information 
allowed others to see new evidence and overcome turf wars. Importantly, the DOJ 
deconfliction meeting facilitated collaboration between the FBI and HSI Chicago, and 
allowed IRS Agent Alford from the DEA Strike Force to review the evidence. Had the 
three agencies not worked together, it might have taken months longer to identify DPR. 
C. INFORMATION SHARING 
The information sharing between the different agencies was key to solving the Silk 
Road investigations. However, institutional friction, turf battles, and egos prevented 
exchange of evidence that may have allowed one of the agencies to arrest DPR sooner. As 
Bashkar and Zheng indicate, management must communicate to employees that 
information sharing is necessary.225 During the first deconfliction meeting between the 
Chicago and Baltimore HSI offices, however, the managers in the room prevented the 
sharing of information between the two agencies, and a turf battle started over the 
investigation. Baltimore believed that it was weeks away from DPR’s arrest and did not 
need Chicago’s help; Chicago thought Baltimore’s investigation strategy would not work 
and did not understand the size of the Silk Road customer base.226 During the DOJ’s 
deconfliction meeting, HSI Baltimore again refused to disclose any of its information, 
claiming that doing so would affect its current grand jury proceedings on the case. HSI 
Baltimore also attempted to influence HSI Chicago without providing any evidence during 
the deconfliction, citing a lack of trust with the FBI.  
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There were several instances of individual agents, too, refusing to share 
information. The FBI agent in charge of the Silk Road investigation refused to 
acknowledge the IRS agent’s contributions to the investigation; the FBI agent did not think 
a lower-status agency like the IRS could contribute anything significant to the 
investigation.227 Thus, the IRS agent refused to offer the information to the FBI, 
prolonging the investigation. Moreover, to protect his criminal actions, the DEA agent 
assigned to the Marco Polo task force did not inform his supervisors about all the 
conversations he had had with DPR, limiting the information in the case. 
The information sharing between Agent Alford and the FBI, however, led directly 
to the identification of Ross Ulbricht as DPR. Alford overcame the FBI’s disinterest in his 
information by showing the AUSA assigned to the case his strategy for identifying Ulbricht 
as a possible subject. The strength of this evidence built trust between Alford and the 
AUSA, which allowed the FBI to target Ulbricht with surveillance and confirm his identity 
as DPR. At the deconfliction meeting, Agent Der-Yeghiayan provided all the information 
he possessed about how to identify mail packages originating from Silk Road vendors, 
helping to get the drugs off the street. By impersonating Cirrus, the Silk Road employee, 
he allowed the FBI to identify the other Silk Road employees and confirm that Ulbricht 
was DPR. 
The seizure of the Silk Road server posed a problem for the corrupt DEA agent who 
was posing as Nob. The DEA agent was providing DPR with case-related information and 
teaching him how to hide from the government in exchange for Bitcoin. Nob feared that 
some of his corrupt conversations with DPR may have been saved on the Silk Road server 
and would implicate him.228 The actions of this corrupt undercover DEA agent show the 
dangers of too much information sharing. When the FBI informed the audience at the 
deconfliction meeting that it had the Silk Road server, it unwittingly informed the corrupt 
agent, who then tried to protect himself. The agent tried to gain access to the server to see 
if it contained any unencrypted files of his conversations with DPR. The FBI Agent in 
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charge of the investigation refused Nob’s request, however, informing him that he needed 
permission from his supervisor to view the server information.229 
D. COLLABORATION  
Although the deconfliction meeting facilitated information sharing and led to the 
collaboration needed to identify and arrest DPR, early attempts at collaboration were not 
very fruitful. HSI Baltimore created the Marco Polo task force to investigate the Silk Road 
and try to identify DPR. Even though agents from the HSI, along with the DEA, made 
some arrests and online contact with DPR himself through discussion forums, these actions 
did not contribute to the other efforts to arrest DPR. Conversely, the Marco Polo task force 
attempted to prevent the Chicago investigation from moving forward during its 
deconfliction meeting so they could garner the credit for arresting DPR and seizing the 
website. 
The first collaboration that affected the Silk Road investigation was between the 
DEA Strike Force, the FBI in New York, and HSI Chicago. The combined resources of the 
three investigative efforts led to the discovery of the bistro in San Francisco that accessed 
the Silk Road’s server. Seeing that the server was accessed by a person in San Francisco 
led Alford to reexamine a person of interest from the area, Ulbricht. When Alford presented 
his new information to the AUSA, they discovered that the computer was named Frosty. 
The FBI’s seizure of the server, coupled with the information provided by Der-Yeghiayan 
in his undercover role, helped confirm the information provided by Alford. Each agent 
used the other agency’s information to develop his evidence further and identify DPR. 
Although Alford identified Ulbricht as a possible subject in March 2012, the lack of 
additional evidence prevented further investigation. The FBI’s additional information 
about the server access in San Francisco and the DHS report about the fake IDs provided 
the additional evidence needed to investigate Ulbricht further. 
Each team approached the investigation of the Silk Road differently, allowing it to 
develop different evidence. The FBI approached the investigation by looking for the server, 
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HSI targeted the mail shipments and the recipients to gain cooperation and access through 
employees, and Alford’s DEA Strike Force conducted a money laundering investigation. 
Ultimately, the evidence produced by the different investigations, when analyzed together, 
provided enough information to identify Ulbricht as DPR.  
E. CONCLUSION  
When Ross Ulbricht created the Silk Road, he used the newest technology to keep 
himself and his buyers anonymous. Ulbricht capitalized on Bitcoin, the dark web, and Tor 
to prevent his arrest for over two years and created a new distribution model for drugs. It 
took the combined efforts of multiple law enforcement agencies—and missteps by DPR—
to develop the evidence that identified Ulbricht and led to his arrest. The first deconfliction 
meeting between the HSI Chicago and Baltimore field offices failed because of ego and 
institutional friction. The second deconfliction meeting, hosted by the DOJ, forced 
information sharing between the different agencies. The meeting brought about the 
collaboration between the FBI in New York and HSI Chicago, but the critical component 
was when Agent Alford learned about the access to the Silk Road server in San Francisco 
from the FBI; this information prompted him to review past subjects, which uncovered 
additional evidence and made Ulbricht a subject. Alford’s ability to identify DPR shows 
that significant information in an investigation can be provided by any person or agency. 
The relevance of that information will not be known until it is reviewed by all participants, 
and the only way that can happen is if all parties are aware of the information.  
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V. SEX MONEY MURDER 
In the early 1990s, violence-plagued the streets of New York City; 1990 started the 
decade with 2,245 murders.230 The crack epidemic turned most low-income 
neighborhoods into war zones, with gangs battling for territory to deal drugs. The residents 
of the Soundview Housing Developments in the Bronx saw the rise of one the most violent 
of these gangs. In 1992, Peter “Pistol Pete” Rollack, a teenage drug dealer, formed Sex 
Money Murder (SMM), a street gang whose drug-dealing empire would span several states 
and use violence and murder to protect its business. Rollack’s influence and control were 
so significant that he was still able to control SMM from his prison cell after being 
sentenced on federal drug charges. With this power, Rollack would order executions from 
his jail cell of anyone he felt might testify against him. 
This case study focuses on the collaboration of North Carolina State Police, a 
special gang task force in the New York City Police Department, and the ATF, which 
produced the evidence and testimony needed to sentence Rollack to life in prison. Although 
the investigation into Rollack and SMM took place before deconfliction was widely used 
in law enforcement, the National Crime Information Center database was used to list 
Rollack as a wanted felon, which allowed the police form North Carolina to indict him for 
drug trafficking. After the North Carolina indictment, the multiple law enforcement 
agencies began sharing information; together, they uncovered an even greater number of 
violent crimes committed by Rollack and his gang. This collaboration allowed law 
enforcement to charge senior members of SMM with violating the RICO statutes; the gang 
members then either cooperated with the federal government or were convicted.  
 
 




Growing up, Rollack idolized the Italian mafioso who brutally executed 
competitors; to ensure success and safety in the drug-dealing business, he knew he needed 
to control the Soundview Houses where he lived and not allow any competition.232 In 
September 1991, Rollack and the other teenage members that would eventually form SMM 
began a drug war with the other dealers in the Soundview Houses.233 The battle with the 
rival drug dealers lasted until November 3, 1991, when an associate of Rollack murdered 
a rival drug dealer in view of multiple witnesses.234 The brazen acts of violence caused the 
older dealers to flee, leaving the Soundview Houses to Rollack and his dealers.  
In the summer of 1992, Rollack officially started referring to his group of drug 
dealers and enforcers as Sex Money Murder. Their main goal was to make as much money 
as possible from dealing drugs, and they would murder anyone who tried to stop them.235 
Members of SMM had a strict code that did not tolerate police cooperation; they would kill 
anyone suspected of snitching, regardless of their rank in SMM. The snitching rule applied 
to everyone in the community, not just SMM’s members. Rollack’s violence extended 
beyond this rule, however. While visiting the annual Harlem Week Festival in August 
1993, Rollack killed Keenyon Jenkins over a gambling debt owed to a friend. Then, on 
April 8, 1994, Rollack killed Karlton Hines, another local drug dealer, who Rollack had 
thought disrespected him in public. When Rollack killed Hines, a witness escaped without 
injury; to ensure the witness did not cooperate with the police, Rollack killed him too.236  
To increase profits, Rollack expanded his organization into other housing 
developments. David “Twin” Mullins, who controlled the drug deals in the neighboring 
Castle Hill Houses, became a lieutenant in SMM and obtained his supply of drugs from 
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Rollack.237 SMM also expanded the drug empire outside New York City, with members 
moving to Kingston and Buffalo, New York, to establish SMM chapters and sell drugs. 
More significantly to Rollack and SMM, however, was their new relationship with an 
interstate trafficker, Savon Codd, who had a car with hidden stash boxes that could hold 
kilos of cocaine, money, and guns, which he used to transport the contraband between 
states.238 Rollack and Codd expanded their interstate dealings to parts of North and South 
Carolina, significantly increasing the size of the SMM drug empire. They eventually 
established satellite gangs in multiple states, ultimately making SMM more powerful.239  
Interstate trafficking was extremely lucrative for SMM. In October 1994, Rollack, 
Codd, and other members of SMM embarked on a trip in a Nissan Quest minivan 
containing a stash box loaded with drugs and weapons. The purpose of the trip was to “re-
up,” or resupply, the satellite locations and pick up the money from the previous drug sales. 
The SMM members traveled to Pittsburgh, then eventually North Carolina. In North 
Carolina, Rollack met with an associate in Rockingham, and the two men got in a dispute 
over a money shortage. Rollack gave the associate twenty-four hours to obtain the 
remaining money, or he would kill him and his family.240 On October 21, 1994, while 
waiting for the associate at a fast-food restaurant, the police received an anonymous tip 
about a Nissan minivan transporting drugs and stopped Rollack and the SMM members.241 
After a canine detected drugs in the vehicle, the police removed Rollack and the SMM 
members to the station house, where Rollack and the others provided the police with fake 
identification and were released without the van so that the police could perform a more 
extensive search242 During the more extensive search of the vehicle, the police discovered 
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the drugs and arrested Rollack and the others before they could return home.243 When the 
police ran the fake IDs, they found no warrants and released the group on bail.  
Rollack was not so lucky, however, during the Harlem Week Festival in August 
1996, when he was arrested for possession of a firearm and the homicides of two rival drug 
dealers. While incarcerated in the Rikers Island jail complex and awaiting trial for the 
homicides, Rollack joined the United Blood Nation—an umbrella organization of the 
Bloods street gangs. The Bloods had a structural organization, a code of conduct, and 
connections in the prison system throughout the state—which protected the incarcerated 
members of the Bloods from the Spanish prison gangs.244 Rollack’s induction 
automatically made all members of SMM Bloods gang members as well, including his 
satellite operations in other states. United Blood Nation subsets provided protection and 
prestige in the members’ criminal world, both inside and outside of prison.245 
The violent acts committed by the SMM members instilled fear in the community, 
preventing cooperation with the police. Although he was free of the homicide charges—
the witnesses had not cooperated with the investigation—Rollack received a sentence of 
two to four years for weapon possession. Additionally, on December 16, 1996, Rollack 
was indicted by the Western District of North Carolina for the October 1994 drug arrest.246 
The North Carolina State Police identified Rollack’s fingerprints through the Nationwide 
Criminal Information Center (NCIC) after his arrest in New York City.247 Rollack was 
moved to a jail in North Carolina to stand trial for the federal narcotics charges. Even while 
incarcerated in North Carolina, Rollack controlled the SMM members by coded letters sent 
through the mail, sending instructions to form a legal fund and continue growing the 
criminal empire in his absence.248  
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While incarcerated in North Carolina, Rollack continued ordering murders as well. 
Rollack believed that several SMM members were cooperating with the police, violating 
his and the Bloods’ snitching ordinance. For example, although David “Twin” Mullin was 
a high-ranking member of SMM, Rollack believed he was responsible for his arrest at the 
Harlem Week Festival and ordered his murder through a coded letter sent from prison.249 
While playing a Thanksgiving Day football game in front of thirty people at the Soundview 
Houses, SMM members killed Mullins and Efrin Solar and injured three other people.250 
In response to this public act of violence, the NYPD tasked a newly formed gang unit to 
investigate the homicides and SMM.251  
Because of the public nature of the Thanksgiving Day homicides, the police asked 
other agencies for help with the investigation. The NYPD gang unit worked with the North 
Carolina State Police and the ATF to uncover evidence linking Rollack to the Thanksgiving 
Day homicides and the current drug trial. Members of the North Carolina State Police and 
the NYPD traveled from state to state to interview witnesses and informants. As a result of 
these interviews, the police gained cooperation from the associate Rollack had threatened 
to kill in October 1994. The interviews also allowed investigators to learn about the size of 
the SMM drug empire and, more importantly, the murders associated with Rollack.  
To secure Rollack’s conviction, the NYPD and the other agencies needed to prove 
to the jury that, even from a prison in North Carolina, Rollack was able to have people 
executed without question. The communication between Rollack and SMM was key to the 
prosecution. On December 17 and December 29, 1997, ATF agents obtained warrants 
allowing law enforcement to intercept the mail between Rollack and SMM members.252 
Members of the NYPD’s gang team traveled to North Carolina and testified in court as 
experts on the Bloods gang, its hierarchy, and its code of honor. Additionally, the NYPD 
explained how Rollack controlled SMM through the mail with a coded language developed 
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by the Bloods and used to prevent law enforcement from developing intelligence on gang 
activities.253 The testimony by the NYPD, the letters obtained from the search warrant, the 
evidence recovered from the minivan, and the cooperator’s testimony resulted in Rollack’s 
conviction and a forty-year prison sentence.  
During Rollack’s drug trafficking trial, the NYPD gang team, with assistance from 
the ATF and Southern District of New York U.S. Attorney’s Office, targeted Rollack and 
the remaining SMM members with an organized crime (RICO Act) investigation. 
Additionally, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District filed a notice with the court that 
it would seek the death penalty for Rollack.254 Thanks to the evidence developed with help 
from the North Carolina State Police, the NYPD charged Rollack with six murders 
committed during his time as head of SMM. Members of the NYPD traveled to North 
Carolina to work with the State Police and the Charlotte Police Department, interviewing 
witnesses and gathering evidence. While the trial used some of the existing evidence from 
the North Carolina drug trafficking conviction to target all of SMM, it was the 
investigators’ work during their trips to North Carolina and other states to gain cooperators 
against Rollack that secured his conviction. The letters used to convict Rollack for 
narcotics trafficking also described how SMM should expand its drug business and provide 
for the gang financially; the testimony by the cooperators described how Rollack killed or 
ordered the deaths of at least six people to keep control of his empire.255 In November 
2000, Rollack pleaded guilty, taking a deal that prevented him from receiving the death 
penalty. Rollack received life plus 105 years for his SMM leadership. Because law 
enforcement knew Rollack would still be able to control SMM from prison, a unique 
condition of his incarceration was that he received limited contact with the outside.256 
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B. DECONFLICTION 
The SMM investigation predated the creation of the SAFETEnet and Case Explorer 
deconfliction systems and occurred when deconfliction was not universal. Although law 
enforcement did not use a deconfliction system during the investigation, the NCIC system 
allowed for information sharing between the North Carolina State Police and the NYPD. 
When police arrested Rollack and other SMM members in North Carolina on October 21, 
1994, they provided the arresting officers with fake IDs and were released on bond to return 
to New York. Their true identities would not be known until the FBI returned the 
fingerprints. When Rollack and the SMM members did not return to North Carolina, law 
enforcement issued a felony warrant in the NCIC.257 Police discovered Rollack’s 
outstanding warrant from North Carolina for firearms possession in August 1996, when 
the FBI confirmed his fingerprints among the evidence. Therefore, the discovery of the 
outstanding warrant led to communication between the NYPD and the North Carolina State 
Police regarding the drug trafficking charges. The notification allowed the State Police to 
indict Rollack and arrest him shortly after he was released from jail.  
The use of a deconfliction system could have resulted in a faster arrest, however. 
When Rollack was arrested in North Carolina in October 1994 for drug possession, he had 
already gained a reputation in the Bronx for the violence perpetrated by SMM and the 
volume of drugs that he sold. In April 1993, the police arrested Rollack for narcotics 
possession in Kingston, New York. If the Kingston Police had registered Rollack in a 
system during this arrest, the North Carolina State Police would have contacted them in 
regards to that arrest. That communication could have led the State Police to indict Rollack 
several years earlier. Additionally, if the NYPD members had been investigating Rollack 
in 1993 or early 1994 and registered him in a deconfliction system, it would have provided 
another point of contact for the North Carolina State Police. Either of these registrations 
might have allowed for Rollack’s indictment before the summer of 1997. 
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C. INFORMATION SHARING 
Critical information sharing between the agencies included the notification between 
the NYPD and the North Carolina State Police about Rollack’s arrest from the NCIC hit 
after Rollack’s arrest at the Harlem Week Festival. Because of the notification from the 
NYPD, the State Police were able to draw up federal trafficking charges against Rollack. 
Rollack’s resulting incarceration in North Carolina was devastating to his organization, as 
Rollack lost direct contact with his lieutenants and was forced to communicate by mail. 
The handwritten letters left a trail of evidence detailing his instructions to SMM. Although 
Rollack wrote the letters in code, they were not destroyed; eventually the letters were used 
as evidence at his trial to show his control of the organization. 
Key to Rollack’s prosecution, too, was convincing the jury that he was the head of 
SMM and that the contraband discovered in the minivan belonged to him. In 1997, during 
the trial, the Bloods gang was new to the East Coast and was not widely known outside 
major metropolitan cities. When SMM became an official Bloods set in 1996, the gangs in 
North Carolina also became Bloods sets and operated under the Bloods code. The NYPD 
provided knowledge and expertise about the Bloods to the North Carolina State Police, 
allowing them to understand how the gang operated. Also, the NYPD’s testimony, 
translating the coded letters to the jury, allowed the prosecutors to show, in Rollack’s 
words, that he was in charge of SMM.  
D. COLLABORATION  
It took the combined efforts of multiple police agencies and two separate federal 
prosecutors’ offices to develop the evidence needed to convict Rollack and the other SMM 
members. The close interaction between the NYPD gang team and the North Carolina State 
Police developed the information needed to convict Rollack and sentence him to life in 
prison. The NYPD provided the prosecutors in North Carolina with the information that 
Rollack communicated with SMM using coded letters. This information allowed the ATF 
to obtain the warrants to seize Rollack’s correspondence, which provided the proof of 
Rollack’s role in the organization when the NYPD translated them for the jury. 
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The NYPD travel to North Carolina to interview cooperators and additional 
subjects in the investigation greatly enhanced the cooperation and the strength of the 
evidence against Rollack. While conducting these interviews, the NYPD discovered the 
number of homicides and shootings that Rollack had committed. With the assistance of the 
North Carolina State Police and Investigators from the Southern District of New York, the 
NYPD gang unit was able to identify six homicide victims. The combined efforts of the 
different agencies, in conjunction with several SMM cooperators, secured Rollack’s 
conviction.  
E. CONCLUSION  
It took the combined efforts of multiple law enforcement agencies to identify and 
convict Peter Rollack for his acts of violence while he ruled his drug empire. Although the 
investigation into SMM took place before deconfliction was commonplace, the North 
Carolina State Police’s use of the NCIC computer system to alert law enforcement of 
wanted felons led to Rollack’s arrest. The information sharing about the arrest and the 
testimony provided by the NYPD gang unit members about the coded letters used to 
instruct the SMM were integral to the conviction. Additionally, the information developed 
by the NYPD during trips to interview cooperators provided the evidence needed to charge 
Rollack and the SMM members with the RICO statute for additional prosecution. 
Furthermore, the investigation conducted by the NYPD provided the evidence and the 
witnesses to charge Rollack with six counts of homicide, which forced Rollack to plead 
guilty to his charges to avoid the death penalty.  
The investigation of SMM, along with the Silk Road and Operation Fast and 
Furious, shows that different agencies develop separate evidence during investigations, and 
very rarely does one unit uncover the entire picture of the criminal organization. 
Information sharing between them allows for a better understanding of the organization, 
can strengthen the evidence, and identify cooperators. Additionally, as the trust builds 
between the different agencies, they will work together in a more significant collaborative 
effort maximizing their resources and capitalizing on their information. 
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VI. FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis posed the question: Can a single, nationwide deconfliction system for 
federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement increase safety, information sharing, and 
collaboration? As of this writing, no federal, regional, or state authority has mandated 
deconfliction systems for all law enforcement agencies. Additionally, agencies decide 
which deconfliction system to use based on regional and personal preferences. As stated in 
an earlier chapter of this thesis, some states use multiple systems, even in the same region, 
which leads to confusion when law enforcement officers register targets and plan 
operational events.258 Furthermore, not all law enforcement agencies have access to every 
deconfliction system, resulting in information gaps between agencies that put officers’ 
lives in danger.  
This chapter presents a policy options analysis that weighs the current state of 
deconfliction in law enforcement against two other possible options, drawing on examples 
from the case studies to illustrate what went well or could have gone better vis-à-vis the 
status quo. The policy options analysis judges the possible options based on the following 
criteria, and as shown in Table 1: deconfliction, which covers ease of use of the systems 
and officer safety; information sharing; collaboration between agencies; oversight of the 
system, which encompasses the use of the system by all agencies and the ability to monitor 
officer safety and duplication of effort; and funding, which deals with the waste of federal 
funding to maintain the multiple systems currently in use. The chapter concludes with a set 
of recommendations for policymakers in expanding the consistent use of deconfliction 
systems. Based on these inconsistencies and gaps, the current use of deconfliction systems 
may not be the best application of technology. 
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Table 1. Policy Options: Status Quo, Two Systems, SHIELD 
 Status Quo Two Systems SHIELD 
DECONFLICTION Fair Good Good 
Ease of use Fair Good Good 
Officer safety Fair Good Good 
INFORMATION SHARING  Low Good Good 
COLLABORATION  Low Good Good 
OVERSIGHT  Low Fair Good 
Mandate Low Fair Good 
      Duplication of effort Low Good Good 
FUNDING Low Good Low 
 
The case studies in this thesis illustrated how the use of deconfliction systems and 
the investigative meetings that followed improved the evidence in the cases through 
information sharing and collaboration. Chapter III examined the failed ATF investigation 
Operation Fast and Furious, which showed how the current use of deconfliction alerted two 
separate federal agencies about a common target, leading to the sharing of vital 
information; however, the information was improperly used and resulted in a federal 
agent’s death. In the Silk Road investigation, examined in Chapter IV, the information 
disclosed during deconfliction meetings led rapidly to the arrest of Ross Ulbricht and the 
seizure of the Silk Road website. Finally, Chapter V’s Sex Money Murder case study 
explored how the collaboration between the NYPD, the North Carolina State Police, and 
the ATF developed the evidence to send Peter Rollack to federal prison for life. All three 
case studies show that when law enforcement personnel discover investigations into the 
same criminals and are willing to share information, they can keep officers safer and 
improve collaboration, which the current deconfliction systems limit. 
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A. OPTION 1: STATUS QUO 
The first option is to keep the existing, mismatched deconfliction systems and 
optional participation by law enforcement agencies. Despite its limitations, does, to an 
extent, keep officers safe while allowing for some information sharing and collaboration. 
Moreover, to address the issue of the multiple systems, in 2016 the National Criminal 
Intelligence Resource Center (NCICC), under the BJA, announced the interconnection of 
SAFETnet, Case Explorer, and RISSafe for event deconfliction with the Partner 
Deconfliction Interface (PDI), which allows a user to access the other systems, but only for 
event deconfliction.259 However, the three systems’ interconnection through the PDI does 
not include the federal deconfliction database, DICE, so investigators must still check 
multiple systems to ensure that investigative targets are free of conflict. Also, the New 
York/New Jersey HIDTA SAFETnet does not participate in the PDI, thus reducing the 
system’s effectiveness. While the PDI provides only event deconfliction for its users, it 
does improve officer safety and reduce the number of computer checks required for law 
enforcement. 
Compounding the issue, neither DOJ nor DHS has called for the mandatory use of 
even one deconfliction system by all law enforcement agencies. While the federal 
government requires the use of DICE, it does not require the nearly 17,000 law 
enforcement agencies in the country to use any of the available deconfliction systems. 
Some agencies, like HSI and the FBI, have issued policies to compel their investigators to 
use the local region’s deconfliction system and the federal DICE system.260 The Policy 
Event Deconfliction Group—an advisory board that oversees deconfliction and comprises 
members of the DEA, BJA, and the Office of the Program Manager, Information Sharing 
Environment (PM-ISE)—liaises with participating agencies to answer technical questions 
and develop policy on the systems requirements, though not on the system’s usage.261 
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Nevertheless, the body of advisors does not have the authority to force any law enforcement 
agency to participate. However, even if the systems’ use were mandated, compliance with 
that mandate would be difficult to monitor or measure.  
Furthermore, there is little or no oversight for the use of deconfliction systems, be 
they federal, regional, or statewide. Without a unit or agency monitoring the deconfliction 
systems, law enforcement cannot obtain data to improve officer safety by preventing blue-
on-blue incidents. Law enforcement agencies might lack information because they may not 
report a blue-on-blue incident, or they may only record the incident in one system. As 
pointed out in a Government Accountability Office report, the federal government 
currently does not hold entities funded by the DOJ, DHS, and ONDCP accountable for the 
lack of coordination.262 When investigators discover an overlap through deconfliction, 
members might share information about the subject and target the organization together, 
facilitating a quicker resolution. Alternatively, when they discover a conflict, one 
investigator might turn his investigation over to the other investigator if he has more 
persuasive evidence against the subject. Oversight of the deconfliction systems will law 
enforcement agencies throughout the country to use the systems more fruitfully and will 
allow for increased data on safety issues, which will benefit the investigators.  
Some components of the federal government acknowledge the risks of multiple 
deconfliction systems. As previously discussed, in 2019, the DOJ and DHS’s combined 
OIG offices issued a report on law enforcement cooperation between the FBI and HSI 
along the southwest border (SWB).263 This report recommendations for improving 
cooperation between the two agencies; the majority of these recommendations dealt with 
developing written policies on how the agents should deconflict with each other. Additional 
recommendations included training the agents assigned to the SWB to ensure that they 
know about the other agency’s deconfliction policy. While the recommendations mention 
the FBI and HSI, they leave out the DEA, ATF, or any other federal, state, local, or tribal 
law enforcement agency that conducts operations along the SWB.  
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Funding also contributes to the inefficiencies associated with the deconfliction 
environment’s current makeup. The three regional deconfliction systems are all funded by 
the federal government. Funding for SAFETnet and Case Explorer comes from the same 
agency, HIDTA, which receives funding from the Office of National Drug Control Policy 
RISS receives its funding from the Bureau of Justice Administration. The use of multiple 
systems funded by taxpayer dollars to provide the same service is wasteful. Additionally, 
along with the federal government’s funding comes oversight of the agency to ensure that 
the money is spent correctly per grant requirements. The funding of multiple systems is an 
additional waste of resources that could be applied elsewhere.  
The following subsections detail how the criteria for the policy options were used 
to gauge the current deconfliction systems, and to show how the two proposed options 
would have helped or hindered investigations based on the case studies.  
1. Deconfliction  
Members of law enforcement are aware of the shortcomings of the current 
deconfliction setup. They must check multiple databases and hold meetings to further 
deconflict with other agencies, which consumes time and manpower. In Operation Fast and 
Furious, the lead agent for the investigation correctly listed her targets in the DICE system, 
which led to a conflict with the DEA over a joint target; the deconfliction meeting between 
the two agencies avoided a possible friendly fire situation and led to the sharing of vital 
information. However, while deconfliction registration and meetings were successful, the 
agent needed an analyst from the DEA to input the information into the system, as she did 
not have access to it. Requiring assistance from another agency may lead to further 
investigation delays, increasing the dangers to law enforcement. The outside investigator 
might challenge the reliability of the other agency or may see that agency as a competitor 
for the casework and try to steal the investigation. 
2. Information Sharing 
The use of the DICE system illustrates how different agencies can share 
information when a conflict in the system brings them together. In Operation Fast and 
Furious, upon learning about the conflict with the DEA, the lead ATF agent scheduled a 
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meeting to discuss their cases; this meeting led to a significant exchange of information 
between the agencies. During the meeting, the ATF identified a drug trafficking subject for 
the DEA. The DEA provided significant information from its investigation, too, which 
eventually helped the ATF obtain a Title III eavesdropping warrant for the investigation—
a priority for the investigator.  
The Silk Road investigation, too, illustrated the usefulness of deconfliction 
meetings. When the FBI informed the other agencies about the Silk Road server’s seizure, 
outside agencies could review the information at their offices. During an office visit, the 
IRS-CI learned that someone had accessed the Silk Road server from San Francisco, the 
home city of a possible suspect, Ross Ulbricht. The IRS-CI presented this information to 
the AUSA assigned to the case with enough collaborating information from the other 
investigators to allow them to surveil and target Ulbricht. However, the announcement of 
the server seizure also alerted the corrupt DEA agent assigned to the HSI Baltimore task 
force that he was in danger of being discovered. The agent attempted to access the server 
and learn DPR’s identity to warn him and protect his criminal actions. The sharing of this 
information in a public forum almost compromised the investigation and allowed for 
DPR’s escape. If the deconfliction landscape’s current makeup continues to exist 
unchanged, law enforcement agencies will still face gaps in information sharing and 
collaboration and will continue to face a safety threat when sharing information in a 
meeting. During the Silk Road investigation, most of the separate investigators might not 
have known about the other cases had it not been for the deconfliction meeting—the 
vehicle for sharing information. That meeting allowed all stakeholders to address the lack 
of information sharing among the agencies and develop their evidence, thus overcoming 
the deconfliction systems’ shortcomings. 
3. Collaboration 
Investigators miss opportunities to collaborate on investigations because they do 
not know about other agencies’ activities. During Operation Fast and Furious, HSI and 
ATF held a deconfliction meeting regarding a firearms seizure made by HSI in Naco, 
Mexico. To foster better cooperation between the two agencies, HSI agreed to stop its 
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firearms investigation and supply one agent to the ATF team; the HSI agents’ role was to 
facilitate information sharing between them. The HSI special agent in charge agreed to this 
arrangement because of a memorandum of understanding that stipulated an increase in 
information sharing; it was necessary to settle disputes at the lowest supervisory levels. 
However, the information provided to the agent was limited. The HSI agent was given 
routine tasks and excluded from meetings. The use of multiple systems led to information 
gaps and missed communications among the agencies; streamlining the process would have 
led to greater collaboration. 
While the status quo is an option, it does not help improve information sharing and 
collaboration. Law enforcement agencies are left with the multiple systems and 
information gaps that can lead to safety issues for investigators. Even if the PDI is expanded 
to include target deconfliction, issues will still arrive due to lack of oversight and 
inconsistent use. Additionally, overlapping investigations by multiple waste resources, and 
funding must go into the multiple systems. For these reasons, law enforcement should 
consider changing their current deconfliction system. 
B. OPTION 2: TWO SYSTEMS 
The second option considered here is for law enforcement to simplify the 
deconfliction picture by reducing the number of systems down to two. If all law 
enforcement agencies—federal, state, local, and tribal—used only one of the 
interconnected regional systems—either SAFETnet, Case Explorer, or RISSafe—and the 
federal government’s DICE system, it would increase safety. This option would provide 
investigators with the information on both event and target deconfliction and would no 
longer require the PDI. A reduction in the number of systems would limit confusion among 
law enforcement agencies about which system individual states use. Additionally, 
consolidating input to two systems would increase the amount of information therein, 
greatly benefiting law enforcement. Moreover, the increased information would allow for 
greater communication and information sharing among agencies.  
Additionally, RISS and HIDTA could require the agencies to implement a self-
inspection program that would require them to audit the systems periodically to ensure 
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proper use. The requirement of a self-inspection program under the terms of use for the 
system ensures compliance from the law enforcement agency. With all the deconfliction 
events and targets entered into one of the two systems, it would be easier to study the 
information and determine the number of enforcement operation failures and investigative 
overlap. An essential problem with this deconfliction option is that, while it would reduce 
investigative conflicts, it would not resolve them completely. The investigators would still 
need access to two separate systems to conduct their checks. Additionally, this option does 
not address the problem of requiring all law enforcement agencies to use the systems. It 
still makes deconfliction an option for each agency.  
This policy option would also allow the agencies to audit the systems for misuse, 
training, and investigative overlap. The DOJ’s OIG could oversee the DICE system, as the 
DEA is under the DOJ. Since RISS and HIDTA developed and maintained their systems, 
they could provide some oversight in conjunction with the agencies that use the systems. 
RISS or HIDTA could monitor the systems for suspicious activity and notify the 
appropriate agency if discovered. 
As stated previously, the funding for the three systems comes from multiple 
government organizations. HIDTA funds Case Explorer and SAFETnet from the ONDCP, 
and the RISSafe system receives funding from the BJA, while the DEA funds DICE. 
Reducing the deconfliction environment down two systems, one regional system and the 
federal system, will also reduce the amount of money spent on the other two systems, 
leaving more money for other criminal justice programs, like community outreach or 
officer training. 
1. Deconfliction 
The use of only one regional system nationwide would have made increased safety 
in the SWB region during Operation Fast and Furious. The Fast and Furious investigation 
tracked firearms purchases as they moved from Phoenix, Arizona, to Mexico; the 
traffickers needed to transport the weapons through at least one additional county in the 
state before they reached the Mexican border. Arizona is one of the states that uses all three 
regional deconfliction systems: RISSafe, SAFETnet, and Case Explorer (see Figure 2, 
75 
which is a replication of Figure 1). Although the reduction to one system used by all the 
agencies would have increased law enforcement’s safety and ensured proper notifications 
to the lead case agent, it only would have done so if law enforcement officers used the 
system to register the events.  
 
Figure 2. Deconfliction Systems by State (Replicated from 
Figure 1 for Your Convenience)264 
2. Information Sharing  
As shown in the Silk Road case study, the HSI Chicago office and Baltimore Office 
learned of each other’s investigations through their case management systems, not through 
 
264 Source: Larence, Information Sharing, 30. 
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a registration conflict. The system design allowed agents to read other agents’ case files, 
with the agent being alerted by an email. Because of this design, agents viewed each other’s 
reports about their investigative status and eventually held a deconfliction meeting in 
Chicago to discuss their progress. The use of the deconfliction systems to initiate contact 
and share information would increase the integrity of the investigations and investigators’ 
safety. A notification through a registration conflict only results in the person learning that 
someone else is interested in a subject; it does not contain any investigative facts. The 
investigator would only divulge any pertinent case information through direct 
communication. While this form of direct communication will increase the investigation’s 
security, it relies on investigators’ willingness to discuss the case with someone else and 
not hoard the information.  
3. Collaboration 
The reduction down to one regional system would allow either the BJA or HIDTA 
to redirect the funds used for their regional system maintenance to other programs. HIDTA 
helps local law enforcement agencies target and dismantle narcotics organizations in 
specific regions around the country. Defunding one or both of their regional systems would 
allow the agency to fund additional task forces and provide assistance to the state and local 
police. Similarly, the BJA could use RISS’s funds, instead, to enhance its mission of 
developing collaboration and partnerships through its grant programs. While the funds may 
not be substantial, this policy option would still end the unnecessary, duplicative systems. 
C. OPTION 3: SHIELD 
The third option is to build an entirely new database to address all the complex 
deconfliction issues identified in this thesis. Because current deconfliction methods in the 
United States are insufficient, the Secure High-Speed Investigative and Event Law 
Enforcement Deconfliction (SHIELD) database, conceived by this author, and its 
accompanying policy would replace the existing systems. All law enforcement agencies 
would participate in the system, which would come with an oversight unit to measure 
compliance. SHIELD would also assess officer safety and duplicative work and allow 
registered users to communicate about possible investigative conflicts at the lowest level. 
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Additionally, to capitalize on the existing technology, the users would submit and register 
subjects and events from the field through agency smartphones. Along with the greater 
oversight, this system would be more easily monitored for misuse of information regarding 
sensitive cases.  
The SHIELD database would be the only system in the United States for law 
enforcement to register investigative targets and planned operational events. Investigators 
would register a person, vehicle, address, or other identifiable information about an 
investigative target or planned enforcement event in the system and receive ownership of 
the registration. If a conflict occurs from the registration, both the registered owner and the 
person attempting the registration would be alerted with an email from the system 
containing each investigator’s contact information. The dual email alert would allow direct 
communication between the investigators, who could then share information, facilitating 
collaboration.  
Furthermore, the SHIELD database would increase the security of an investigation. 
Supervisors would receive notifications when another investigator attempts to register a 
designated sensitive investigation subject, enhancing the case’s security. If an investigator 
tries to register the subject of a sensitive investigation (e.g., terrorism, public corruption, 
high-profile person), the system send an email to the supervisor and to the investigator who 
initially registered the subject. The supervisor must contact the other investigator’s 
supervisor to discuss the subject and the investigator’s evidence. The supervisors would 
then confer before interviewing the investigators; if either investigator does not have valid 
evidence for registering the subject in SHIELD, the supervisor in charge of the sensitive 
investigation can notify internal affairs. This notification system helps reduce inquiries into 
sensitive investigations and prevents possible exploitation by corrupt law enforcement 
officials. A single deconfliction system alleviates the need to monitor multiple systems and 
allows law enforcement to register updates, increasing safety. 
Law enforcement officers need easy access to the deconfliction system to obtain 
information in real time. The SHIELD comes with state-of-the-art mobile technology, 
allowing law enforcement to increase the safety for personnel during operational events. 
Investigators can access the SHIELD database in the field through an agency- or 
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department-issued smartphone, which is connected to the system through a protected 
virtual private network—thus allowing investigators to register an event location during 
undercover operations. Undercover narcotics or gun buys are complicated operations in 
which the safety of the undercover officer is paramount. During some undercover buys, the 
drug dealer will meet up with the undercover and move to another location, either by car 
or on foot, to improve the security of the transaction and to look for the police. Having 
access to the SHIELD system through a smartphone will allow the investigator to register 
the drug buy’s new location. The event registration will increase the undercover’s safety 
by alerting other agencies about the operation if they attempt to register an event. 
To ensure participation from all law enforcement agencies on the state, local, and 
tribal levels, the DOJ and DHS should make access to federal criminal justice and 
homeland security federal grants contingent upon participation in the system. The Ed Byrne 
Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) Program, for instance, provides federal grants 
for a range of criminal justice services to nonfederal law enforcement agencies.265 Just as 
the federal government proposed penalties on states that would not raise the legal drinking 
age to twenty-one in 1984, they could penalize law enforcement agencies for not 
participating in the SHIELD database. For instance—and although doing so may require 
congressional approval—if the state, local, and tribal agencies fail to participate in the 
SHIELD database, they would see a 10 percent reduction in funds through the JAG. Tying 
the use of the SHIELD database to grant funding gives a powerful incentive for all law 
enforcement agencies to use the system.266  
The SHIELD deployment would alleviate most of the issues identified in the joint 
FBI and HSI OIG report mentioned previously in this thesis; but it would reach further, as 
it would apply to all law enforcement agencies, not just the FBI and HSI. Because the 
SHIELD system would mandate use by all law enforcement agencies and have set 
 
265 The Public Health and Welfare, 42 USC § 3751(a). 
266 The Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force puts similar limits on their funding to state 
and local agencies. Any funds provided by OCDETF for overtime must be earned by a full-time task force 
officer working on an OCDETF case. Additionally, funding for overtime cannot be used for the purchase of 
information or equipment.  
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procedures governing its use, it would eliminate the need for MOUs between agencies, 
making it easier for them to share information and work together.   
The government would need a full-time agency to ensure that all law enforcement 
agencies are using the system correctly and in compliance with the money received from 
the JAG. This oversight group would collect information about the system’s use, like the 
number of blue-on-blue incidents prevented by event deconfliction each year, which would 
allow them to analyze the incidents and issues training memos. An oversight agency can 
also enhance coordination and reduce investigative overlap, facilitating more efficient use 
of resources. An office composed of members from both the DOJ and DHS OIG should 
assume these duties; this combined office would have the authority to investigate all the 
federal components that use SHIELD. This new unit could also refer smaller investigations 
to the appropriate internal investigative unit when it involves non-criminal issues or 
improper use of the system for the state, local, and tribal levels of law enforcement.  
While it may be costly to develop the SHIELD database, it could potentially save 
money for the government in the long run. After the initial investment to build and deploy 
the system, the government would need only to maintain one deconfliction system, not the 
multiple systems that are currently in use. This option will allow for more money to be 
allocated to the public for other criminal justice programs, just on a larger scale.  
1. Deconfliction 
During Operation Fast and Furious, the use of multiple deconfliction systems 
complicated the investigation and increased the dangers to law enforcement. The lead case 
agent needed a DEA analyst to register data in the DICE system, which forced her to rely 
on another agency to accomplish her work. Access to the SHIELD database would have 
allowed her to complete the registration herself; any other agent would have then been 
notified if they entered conflicting data into the system. This would be more efficient and 
would ensure that the subjects are properly registered. Additionally, with the registration 
in a single system, there would have been fewer dangers for law enforcement in Arizona. 
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2. Information Sharing 
During the Silk Road investigation, multiple agencies and task forces across the 
country were conducting simultaneous independent investigations, some of them unaware 
of the parallel investigations. Registration of the subjects in the SHIELD database would 
have led to notifications among the different investigators, which would have allowed the 
investigators to discuss their evidence; this information sharing could have led to 
significant improvements in the case before the DOJ held the mandatory deconfliction 
meeting. The exchange of information could have led to faster collaboration among the 
agencies, allowing for a quicker end to the investigation and the illegal Silk Road activities.  
3. Collaboration 
In the Sex Money Murder investigation, multiple agencies had to collaborate to 
convict Rollack. After Rollack was arrested and released in North Carolina, he returned to 
New York and never left the city again. While the State Police issued a warrant for 
Rollack’s arrest and listed it in the NCIC system, they did not notify the NYPD about 
Rollack’s North Carolina crimes. If the State Police had registered Rollack in the SHIELD 
database, they would have received a notification when the NYPD member attempted to 
register him in New York. The notification would have allowed the agencies to work 
together sooner, targeting Rollack and the other SMM members. An earlier arrest would 
have saved lives and improved the quality of life in the Soundview Houses of the Bronx, 
which was plagued by the crack epidemic and SMM violence.  
D. HYPOTHETICAL SCENARIO 
This section presents how a hypothetical law enforcement operation would play out 
with each of the policy options proposed in this thesis. The scenario itself describes the 
status quo, and the following paragraphs describe the remaining two options: the two-
systems approach and SHIELD.  
(1) The Scenario and the Status Quo 
Using an undercover agent, HSI is planning a drug buy from a known drug dealer 
along the SWB in Texas. The lead agent prepares the undercover agent’s operation plan, 
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listing all the computer checks he conducted on the dealer. To ensure the undercover 
agent’s safety, the agent has registered all available information about the dealer in the 
federal DICE system; additionally, because of the number of law enforcement agencies 
that operate along the SWB, the agent has registered the dealer and the proposed buy 
location in all three regional systems, RISSSafe, Case Explorer, and SAFETnet. At the 
meeting location, the dealer tells the undercover agent that the drugs are at a different 
location, and he must follow him to complete the transaction. The dealer is driving a 
previously unknown vehicle, which the agent has not registered. The unknown vehicle and 
the new buy location increase the dangers to the undercover agent, who must decide if the 
operation is worth the dangers before proceeding. To ensure the undercover agent’s safety, 
the lead agent asks another agent to check the new car and location, which will take the 
agent some time. After learning that there are no conflicts, the drug transaction proceeds 
without further delays.  
(2) Two Systems 
If the scenario were conducted using the DICE and SAFETnet systems only, the 
workload of the lead agent would be reduced: he would only need to conduct searches in 
two databases to register the subject and the event. However, the agent would still need to 
have another agent in the office register the new car and buy location while they were in 
the field. That said, the agent would have been able to conduct those searches faster because 
he would only need to search two systems.  
(3) SHIELD 
If the scenario were conducted with use of the SHIELD database, the planning and 
operation would be less complicated and more secure. Instead of conducting multiple 
database inquiries while planning the undercover buy, the agent would have only needed 
to access the SHIELD database to register the event. Additionally, when the dealer arrived 
in an unknown car and changed the buy location, the agent or a member of his field team 
could have registered the car and the new location from the field, ensuring the undercover 
agent’s safety by confirming that no other agency was investigating the dealer or planning 
an event at the new buy location. 
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E. RECOMMENDATION 
The analysis in this thesis shows that the current deconfliction model hinders 
information sharing and creates safety issues for law enforcement. Considering the 
complexity of the various deconfliction systems and their importance to law enforcement 
personnel, a wholesale change to the deconfliction environment—the SHIELD option—
might prove difficult, as the system will come with a new set of requirements and policy. 
This option would also require congressional legislation and the creation of a new oversight 
body, which may prove too time-consuming or challenging. The new database itself may 
also be costly and time-consuming to create, particularly considering the FBI spent almost 
$500 million and over ten years creating its current management system.267  
The option to limit deconfliction to two systems may therefore be the most logical 
move for the law enforcement community. The continued use of the DEA’s DICE system 
in conjunction with the expansion of either SAFETnet, Case Explorer, or RISSafe is 
feasible and provides the most significant benefit to law enforcement. With only two 
systems to access and search for deconfliction targets and events, investigators would have 
greater confidence that their operations are safe from other law enforcement personnel and 
that no one else is targeting their subjects. The reduction down to two systems would also 
allow for some monitoring and auditing to improve officer safety and identify waste. This 
option would incur no additional cost for design and deployment, and allows the funding 
for the discontinued systems to be reallocated. Additionally, the increased information in 
the systems would help law enforcement better navigate the increasingly complex criminal 
environment. Universal use, however, is necessary for successful information sharing and 
collaboration. This option, by itself, does not improve participation among the agencies; 
this issue needs to be address by the law enforcement community through training.  
To compel agencies to use the systems, and to use them properly, the law 
enforcement community will need support from the DOJ and the DHS. A mandate 
requiring the use of the systems by all agents will help overcome current reluctance and 
 
267 “F.B.I. Computer System Is Late and Over Budget, Report Says,” The New York Times, October 
20, 2010, https://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/21/us/21brfs-FBICOMPUTERS_BRF.html. 
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press enforcement at state, local, and tribal levels. If organizations like the International 
Associations of Chiefs of Police and the Police Executive Research Forum request that 
member agents or agencies use the systems, they can also help increase public knowledge 
about the systems and their use. 
With greater participation and only two systems, it will be easier to collect data 
collection for safety reports of investigative overlap. The agencies that operate the systems 
will be able to monitor the systems more closely, allowing them to generate reports based 
on safety issues. Also, the agencies will be able to identify how often multiple agencies 
target the same people and monitor resources. While the internal report generating would 
not be as robust as it would be with an OIG monitoring the system, the reports will still be 
significantly more comprehensive than anything currently generated. 
The reduction down to one regional system will also address the waste of resources; 
no longer would law enforcement need to fund three-separate regional deconfliction 
systems. Money allocated by either the ONDCP or the BJA that supports the three systems 
could be redirected to, or instance, counter-drug programs and treatment programs. 
F. CONCLUSION 
This research asked how a single, nationwide deconfliction system for federal, 
state, local, and tribal law enforcement might increase safety, information sharing, and 
collaboration. The thesis examined how the different deconfliction systems law 
enforcement currently uses lead to confusion and safety issues, and how they limit 
investigators’ opportunities to connect with other agencies investigating similar targets, 
which can cause them to miss vital evidence that might lead to the subject’s arrest. 
Additionally, multiple systems increase the dangers to law enforcement personnel who are 
conducting proactive street investigations.  
As shown in the case studies, deconfliction plays a vital role in law enforcement 
investigations; how the investigators use the knowledge gained from deconfliction 
meetings is up to them. The lead agent in Operation Fast and Furious deconflicted through 
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personal meetings and the federal deconfliction database, DICE.268 Because the agent used 
the proper system to register her subjects, she received a notification when another agent 
attempted to register the same subject. The conflict allowed the agencies to meet, and the 
information the ATF received during the meeting helped them obtain the Title III 
wiretap.269 While the ATF used the deconfliction process correctly and prevented a 
possible blue-on-blue situation, they failed to capitalize on the information provided by the 
other agency, which prolonged the investigation and resulted in the death of a Border Patrol 
agent.  
Ross Ulbricht used modern technology to create the Silk Road online drug empire 
that stymied multiple law enforcement agencies for several years. During the website’s 
life, law enforcement agencies investigated Ulbricht under his pseudonym, DPR, but were 
only able to arrest low-level dealers on the site. As a result of a deconfliction meeting at 
the DOJ, however, all the agencies investigating the Silk Road began to make progress; 
their collaboration led investigators to identify Ulbricht as DPR and seize the Silk Road 
website.270  
The Sex Money Murder gang dealt drugs and death across the Bronx while making 
millions of dollars, eventually exporting their drugs and violence around the country. 
Collaboration between the NYPD gang team, the North Carolina State Police, and the ATF, 
however, led to two federal convictions against gang leader Peter Rollack and the 
incarceration of other members of SMM. Together, the three agencies were able to develop 
the necessary evidence and testimony to see Rollack face the death penalty. While the 
agencies’ collaboration did not come about because of deconfliction, the NCIC notification 
allowed for the initial notification and information sharing between the agencies.271 The 
investigators convicted Rollack for drug trafficking in North Carolina and also discovered 
his connection to multiple homicides, forcing him to take a life-sentence plea.272  
 
268 Department of Justice Office of Inspector General, ATF’s Operation Fast and Furious. 
269 Department of Justice Office of Inspector General, 122. 
270 Bilton, American Kingpin. 
271 Ferranti, Street Legends, 249. 
272 Green, Sex Money Murder, 312. 
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With multiple deconfliction systems in use, and with no policy or mandate for law 
enforcement agencies to participate in the systems, deconfliction is not as effective as it 
could be. In creating the PDI, the HIDTA and RISS governing boards acknowledged that 
the separate deconfliction systems are inefficient and dangerous. If the boards of HIDTA 
and RISS, along with the federal partners, cared about officer safety, however, they would 
address the current problems with deconfliction to simplify—and make mandatory—the 
system’s use. Realistically, there is no significant downside to the proper use of a 
deconfliction system; there are only safety benefits, increased information sharing, and 
collaboration. These benefits outweigh the one possible drawback, corruption.  
While the SHIELD database, with proper oversight and incentives for use, would 
be the ideal method to solve the current deconfliction issue, its creation would be 
complicated. However, if law enforcement agencies choose to reduce the number of 
deconfliction systems down to two—one regional system and the federal system—the less 
complicated model, combined with a strong push by the law enforcement community for 
universal use, would alleviate some of the problems identified in this thesis. The 
elimination of information silos, first and foremost, would benefit everyone who 
participates in investigative efforts. For law enforcement to be successful, agencies need 
to work together and share information; while deconfliction systems help keep officers 
safe, they also bring agencies together. The implementation of incremental improvements 
to the system will increase officer safety during field operations, increase collaboration 
across agencies, and reduce waste in funding and investigative overlap. These small 
changes can occur if the federal law enforcement agencies, along with the governing boards 
for HIDTA and RISS, collectively address this issue with police fraternal organizations 
across the country.  
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APPENDIX A. OPERATION FAST AND FURIOUS TIMELINE  
October 2009 ATF Phoenix Field Office establishes Group VII, the lead 
investigative unit. 
October 31 Group VII is notified by an FFL holder of the purchase of a 
suspicious firearm by Jacob Chambers.. 
November 1–4 Group VII learns of three additional purchase incidents made by 
new subjects at several FFL holders locations. 
November 18 Group VII connects the different individuals through 
surveillance and officially opens the investigation. 
November  Jamie Avila is identified as a subject of the investigation. 
November 20 Group VII learns of the Mexican seizure of forty-two firearms in 
the Naco, Sonora, region of Mexico. Several identified subjects 
purchased these firearms. HSI agents from ICE interview the 
arrested subjects. 
November 30 ATF hosts a deconfliction meeting with ICE. ATF takes the lead 
on the investigation and ICE agrees to assign an HSI agent to the 
case. 
November All identified firearms are entered into the Suspect Gun 
Database by case agents. The lead case agent submits six phone 
numbers to DEA for deconfliction in the DICE system. 
December 1 Group VII identifies 341 firearms from local FFL holders, 
purchased by as many as 15 subjects. 
December 9 Firearms purchased during the investigation begin to be 
recovered by Mexican authorities from cartel members. 
December 11 Manual Celis-Acosta is identified as a subject. 
December 14 A DEA analyst attempts to register Jacob Chambers’s phone 
number and discovers a conflict with ATF. They schedule a 
deconfliction meeting for December 15. 
December 15 At the deconfliction meeting, the DEA states that Celis-Acosta 
is dealing with a subject, Manual Marquez. The DEA gives the 
ATF permission to approach Celis-Acosta, but only if the ATF 
is present. The ATF does not act on this information. The DEA 
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provides the ATF with information that will allow the DEA to 
obtain a Title III wiretap warrant. 
December 17 The ATF and the first FFL holder hold a meeting to discuss the 
number of firearms sold. The FFL holder is concerned about the 
number of guns sold and officer safety, and that he is 
implicating himself in the case. The ATF informs the FFL 
holder that they are doing everything possible to recover the 
firearms. 
December 22 The DEA informs the ATF about a transfer between Celis-
Acosta and another person in El Paso, Texas. The ATF does not 
conduct surveillance due to manpower constraints. 
December By the end of December 2009, the nineteen subjects of 
Operation Fast and Furious have purchased 690 firearms. 
January 4, 2010 Group VII decides to obtain a Title III wiretap warrant for 
several subjects in the investigation. 
January 16 Jamie Avia purchases the firearm that will kill Border Patrol 
Agent Brian Terry. 
February  Operation Fast and Furious is designated an OCDETF 
investigation. 
March 16 Group VII starts intercepting subjects’ phone calls. 
April–August Subjects continue to purchase firearms and traffic them to 
Mexico. Group VII continues to conduct surveillance but does 
not interdict any firearms. 
May 29, 2010 The CBP arrests Celis-Acosta at the Lukeville, Arizona, border 
crossing. The lead case agent interviews Celis-Acosta but does 
not arrest him or ask him to cooperate against the cartel. 
August 2 The ATF Title III wiretap warrant ends; no additional subjects 
or evidence is discovered during the wiretap period. 
August ATF begins to move toward an indictment of the subjects. 
December 14 Border Patrol Agent Terry is killed near Rio Rico, Arizona.  
December 15 ATF learns that a Fast and Furious firearm killed Terry. 
January 25, 2011 The U.S. Attorney’s Office of Arizona indicts thirty-four 
defendants in connection with Operation Fast and Furious. 
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APPENDIX B. SILK ROAD TIMELINE 
January 23, 2011 Ross Ulbricht creates the Silk Road on the dark web. 
January 27 An account is created on Shroomery.com under the name Altoid, 
later discovered to be Ross Ulbricht; the user asks people if they 
have heard about the Silk Road. 
January 28 A message is posted in Bitcointalk, asking if users have heard 
about the Silk Road. 
June 1 Adrian Chen’s Gawker article is published online. 
June 5, 2011 Senators Charles Schumer and Joe Manchin ask the DOJ and 
DEA to investigate the Silk Road. 
October 11 Altoid, posts on Bitcointalk to request help with a Bitcoin 
startup. 
October 13 HSI Agent Jared Der-Yeghiayan opens Operation Dime Store to 
investigate drug seizures at the O’Hare Airport Mail Facility. 
November HSI agents in Baltimore take over the seller account of a Silk 
Road vendor. The vendor becomes a cooperator. 
November The Marco Polo task force is formed in Baltimore. 
February 2, 2012 A deconfliction meeting is held between HSI Chicago and the 
Marco Polo task force. 
March 3 Ulbricht creates an account under the username on the Stack 
Overflow message board under the name Frosty. 
March 4 DEA Agent Carl Mark Force begins talking with DPR as “Nob.” 
January 13, 2013 Marco Polo members arrest a Silk Road employee during a 
controlled delivery of drugs; the employee agrees to work with 
law enforcement. 
March 16 A question is posted to Stackoverflow about how to program 
with curl. After the post, the user changes his name to Frosty. 
May 26 IRS CI uncovers the first mention of the Silk Road by Altoid 
posted on Shroomery.com. 
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June 1 The IRS CI investigator discovers the Altoid post asking for 
programming help and that it is connected to the email address 
rossulbricht@gmail.com. 
June 12 The FBI discovers the Silk Road server’s location in Iceland and 
asks local authorities to image the device. 
July Der-Yaghiayan begins impersonating Silk Road employee 
Cirrus. 
July 10 CBP discovers nine fake IDs in the mail that were ordered by 
Ross Ulbricht. 
July 13 A deconfliction meeting occurs at the DOJ with members of the 
Marco Polo task force, HSI Chicago, FBI, and DEA Strike 
Force from New York. 
July 26 Ulbricht is interviewed by DHS agents about the fake IDs. 
July 29 The FBI receives an imaged copy of the Silk Road server from 
the Reykjavik Metropolitan Police. 
August The corrupt undercover DEA agent tries to sell information to 
DPR about the investigation to protect the agent’s identity. 
September 10 The IRS CI explains to the AUSA and other investigators why 
he thinks Ulbricht is DPR. 
Late September Members of the FBI begin to conduct surveillance on Ulbricht in 
San Francisco to confirm that his computer usage time coincides 
with DPR’s posts on the Silk Road website. 




APPENDIX C. SEX MONEY MURDER TIMELINE 
1992 Peter Rollack forms the Sex Money Murder gang in the 
Soundview Public Housing Development in the Bronx. 
August 16, 1993 Rollack kills Keenyon Jenkins at the Harlem Week Festival over 
a gambling dispute with David Mullin. 
April 8, 1994 Rollack kills Karlton Hines on Boston Road in the Bronx over a 
show of disrespect and attempts to kill Carlos Mestre. 
June 1994 Rollack kills Anthony Dunkley in the Bronx over a dispute. 
July 17, 1994 Rollack kills Carols Mestre to prevent his cooperation with the 
police about the Hines murder. 
October 21, 1994 Rollack, David Gonzales, and Savon Codd, are arrested in 
Rockingham, North Carolina, on charges of drug and firearms 
possession, and then released. 
August 9, 1996 Rollack is arrested at Grant’s Tomb for criminal possession of a 
weapon and for the murder of Hines. 
Fall 1996 Rollack and SMM become an official Bloods set. 
Fall 1996 Rollack is sentenced to two to six years for weapons possession. 
December 16, 1996 Rollack is indicted for narcotics trafficking stemming from his 
October 1994 North Carolina arrest. 
November 27, 1997 David Mullin and Efrin Solar are killed while playing football at 
the Soundview Housing Complex, under orders from an 
incarcerated Rollack. 
January 2, 1997 Rollack is transferred to North Carolina to await trial. 
February 6, 1997 Rollack’s trial begins. 
February 1998 Rollack and ten other members of SMM are indicted in the 
Southern District of New York for RICO charges concerning the 
gang’s criminal activities. 
March 31, 1998 Rollack is convicted in North Carolina. 
January 2000 Rollack is sentenced to life plus 105 years for leading SMM. 
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